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Regulators and firms often use incentive schemes to attract skillful agents and to induce them to put
forth effort in pursuit of the principals' goals. Incentive schemes that reward skill and effort, however,
may also punish agents for adverse outcomes beyond their control. As a result, such schemes may
induce inefficient behavior, as agents try to avoid actions that might make it easier to directly associate
a bad outcome with their decisions. In this paper, we study how such caution on the part of individual
agents may lead to inefficient market outcomes, focusing on the context of natural gas procurement
by regulated public utilities. We posit that a regulated natural gas distribution company may, due to
regulatory incentives, engage in excessively cautious behavior by foregoing surplus-increasing gas
trades that could be seen ex post as having caused supply curtailments to its customers. We derive
testable implications of such behavior and show that the theory is supported empirically in ways that
cannot be explained by conventional price risk aversion or other explanations. Furthermore, we demonstrate
that the reduction in efficient trade caused by the regulatory mechanism is most severe during periods
of relatively high demand and low supply, when the benefits of trade would be greatest.
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One of the central challenges that managers and regulators face arises when they must
rely on agents, whose eﬀorts and abilities are imperfectly observable, to choose actions
that will advance the manager’s or regulator’s goals for the ﬁrm. The problem of design-
ing incentive mechanisms that will induce economically eﬃcient choices by agents is the
subject of an entire ﬁeld of economics. The usual solution when eﬀorts and abilities are
unobservable is to reward agents instead on the basis of observable outcomes. As Holm-
strom (1999) discusses, one important question in this literature is how to get agents who
are thus compensated to undertake the level of risk that is optimal from the principal’s
point of view. There is more than one possible impediment. One classic reason why agents
may undertake insuﬃcient risk is that they are simply more risk averse in income than the
principal is. If this is the case, then an incentive scheme that rewards an agent according
to the principal’s payoﬀs will result in less risk-taking than the principal would prefer.
Holmstrom describes a second reason for an agent to undertake insuﬃcient risk, one
that does not hinge on risk-aversion over income: “career concerns.” Career concerns
arise when agents diﬀer in their levels of ability, and when their rewards (compensation,
retention, promotion) depend not only on the outcomes of their actions, but also on what
the principal infers from those outcomes about the agents’ underlying levels of ability.
Examples in which rewards are based only on outcomes (and are therefore not inﬂuenced
by career concerns) include sales commissions or any kind of piece-rate compensation:
agents are paid on the basis of output, and the principal makes no attempt to assess how
hard the agent worked or how skilled he or she is. Another example of a pure outcome-
based reward is an exam in which a candidate receives a scholarship or gets admitted to
a school based on his or her score. A third example is a ﬁxed price construction contract
in which a contractor is paid a previously-agreed sum once the building is satisfactorily
completed, independent of when the job is ﬁnished.
In contrast, there are many examples in which career concerns do arise because rewards
depend on ex post inference, rather than being determined solely by explicit functions of
output. One example is professors receiving tenure. While more and better publications
will help a professor receive tenure, there are generally not explicit contracts that specify
how many papers of what quality will guarantee tenure. Instead, the tenure decision
depends in large part on the senior faculty’s inference about the candidate based on the
candidate’s output. Another example is executives who are promoted on the basis of
job evaluations. Their quantiﬁable accomplishments matter, but so does what their boss
thinks of them on the basis of their accomplishments. A third example is athletes drafted
by sports teams: past performance will matter, but so will what the coach infers about
1the athlete as a result. A ﬁnal example is startup ﬁrms funded by venture capitalists. The
venture capitalists’ continued investment depends not only on the ﬁnancial returns, but
on what they believe about the management team of the startup.
A key insight of Holmstrom’s is that if agents recognize that their rewards depend in
part on the principal’s ex post inference, then they may try to manipulate the principal’s
formation of that inference. Speaking in terms of an agent delegated to make investment
decisions, Holmstrom concludes that an agent will not prefer the investment opportunities
that have the highest expected payoﬀs, but instead those that “leave him protected by
exogenous reasons for failure.” (Holmstrom, 1999, p. 179) The agent would like to choose
a project for which, should it fail, the principal will have to take into account in forming ex
post inferences some causes of failure that are not the agent’s fault. Said another way, the
agent “dislikes investments, which will reveal accurately whether he is a talented manager
or not, since these investments make his income most risky.” (Holmstrom, 1999, p. 179)
The idea that an agent may wish to undertake actions that will manipulate the ex post
inferences made by an observer appears in a variety of contexts in the economics literature.
For example, Brandenburger and Polak (1996) show that decision-makers whose rewards
depend in part on what an outside observer (“the market”) thinks of the decision will ignore
their own contrary private information in order to choose what the market thinks is correct,
a phenomenon they call “covering your posteriors.” Scharfstein and Stein (1990) point to
inference manipulation as a reason for managers to mimic the investment decisions of others
–“follow the herd”–in order to signal to the labor market that they are “smart” managers
who know what all the other smart managers know, rather than “dumb” managers whose
information is just noise. Palley (1994) suggests that relative compensation will make
it risky to make choices that are too diﬀerent from the choices of others. In a model
of “skill signalling,” Harbaugh (2006) shows that an agent will avoid gambles for which
loss has the potential to reveal poor judgment. A very diﬀerent application of inference
manipulation is Fudenberg and Tirole’s (1986) “signal-jamming” model of predation, in
which an incumbent ﬁrm tries to manipulate an entrant ﬁrm’s ex post inference about the
entrant ﬁrm’s costs.
In this paper, we aim to extend this aspect of the principal-agent literature by examining
not just the impact on the ﬁrm of decisions designed to manipulate a principal’s ex post
inference, but the impact on the market when many ﬁrms make decisions this way. We
ﬁnd that these eﬀects can signiﬁcantly distort market outcomes and create ineﬃciencies.
In our particular context, this is exhibited as a reduction in the volume of transactions
during precisely the times when potential gains from trade are highest: the market dries
2up just when trades would be most valuable.
The context in which we consider these issues is the market for wholesale natural gas.
Over the last 30 years, regulators of public utilities have increasingly favored various forms
of incentive regulation over simple cost-of-service regulation. This change in regulatory
structure has brought to the fore the parallel between managerial and regulatory challenges
in designing incentive-driven compensation. Regulators, who are the principals in this
context, have two goals for the regulated utility. First, they want the utility to minimize its
cost so as to minimize, ultimately, the costs to ratepayers. Second, they want the utility to
ensure service quality. Of course, these two objectives will generally be in tension, because
investments in service quality are likely to increase costs. The regulator generally gives
the utility explicit incentives to reduce costs, spelled out in the rules governing the rate-
making process. Incentives to provide service quality, however, may be more implicit. In
this paper, we focus on the regulator’s desire to have the utility avoid a very fundamental
service failure: running so low on reserves that it has to curtail deliveries, temporarily
denying customers access to natural gas. In the industry, this concern is referred to as
“security of supply.”
There are several reasons for regulators (and, as a consequence, utilities) to be concerned
about security of supply in natural gas. First, there is very little scope for end-use customer
demand response because regulated prices do not change very frequently, certainly not
with day-to-day demand ﬂuctuations. Second, spot markets for natural gas can be thin–
especially during periods when demand is high–due to pipeline network constraints and
coordination problems. As a result, if a utility has not procured enough gas to meet
realized demand, it may not have a recourse other than curtailment to address the shortage
in the short run. A curtailment is something regulators–and utilities–want to avoid,
both because of economic costs (such as business disruption for industrial customers)
and political costs (arising from inconvenienced customers complaining to elected political
leaders who then demand accountability from regulatory bodies).
As we have spoken to utility executives, it is clear that they believe that there would
be signiﬁcant negative consequences for this type of service failure. Furthermore, it is also
clear that utilities believe that the harshness of the penalty depends on what inference
the regulator draws about why a curtailment happened. In particular, a curtailment that
occurred despite a utility’s best eﬀorts to procure additional supplies would incur conse-
quences less severe than a curtailment that was more directly attributable to a mistake
or misjudgment on the utility’s part. In light of this, utility executives have told us that
they would particularly wish to avoid a situation in which they had sold reserves of gas
3that could have been used later to avert or mitigate a curtailment. Not only would these
circumstances appear to the ratepaying public as (at best) a lack of foresight or (at worst)
proﬁteering, but it virtually guarantees that the regulator will not infer that the utility
was doing its best to avert the disaster.
We predict that utilities, in an attempt to prevent the regulator from having grounds to
make this inference, will resist selling reserves when it expects the spot market to be tight
and curtailments to be possible, and that it will do so to a greater degree than the regulator
would wish it to. We call this behavior “excess caution.” Of course, the regulator wants
the utility to be cautious about making sales in such a situation, because curtailments are
costly for the regulator. By “excess caution” we mean the additional reluctance on the
utility’s part to sell reserves it might need, in order to manipulate the regulator’s inference
process.1 Excess caution in this context is analogous to the unwillingness to invest on
the part of Holmstrom’s (1999) managers, the desire to herd into popular investments by
Scharfstein and Stein’s (1990) managers, or the choice to do what “the market” wants by
Brandenburger and Polak’s (1996) decision-makers.
Our primary aim in this paper is to model and empirically estimate the eﬀect of secu-
rity of supply concerns and excess caution on market outcomes in wholesale natural gas
markets. Our model yields two testable market implications. First, the forward price for
natural gas will exceed the expected spot price when supplies are expected to be tight
and curtailments are possible. Second, because utilities will be relatively less likely to sell
gas in forward markets in tight-supply conditions, even when there exist other ﬁrms that
place a higher valuation on marginal supplies, the quantity of forward transactions will be
reduced. We ﬁnd that data from natural gas markets support both of these predictions.
Furthermore, while alternative theories regarding ﬁrm behavior in these markets, such as
price risk aversion, can also predict the existence of forward premia, only “excess cau-
tion” of utilities regarding forward sales of gas implies reductions in forward transaction
quantities.
Our ﬁndings suggest that skill signalling between a principal and agent, in combination
with the agent’s expectation of a severe penalty for being judged as relatively unskilled, can
cause signiﬁcant market ineﬃciencies beyond the individual principal-agent relationship.
In natural gas markets, it appears that the desire of utilities to avoid curtailments that
1 The caution that regulators would wish to have exercised would result, on the margin, in an equal
reluctance to sell and eagerness to buy; i.e., equal marginal valuations for an incremental sale as for
an incremental purchase. “Excess caution” is a greater marginal valuation for incremental sales than
for incremental purchases; i.e., a greater reluctance to sell than willingness to buy. In section 3, we
incorporate this concept in a theoretical model.
4could be directly attributed to their actions actually makes it substantially more diﬃcult
for utilities as a group to allocate supplies to those utilities and customers who need them
most. Furthermore, this reduction in eﬃcient trade occurs at precisely those times at
which the trades are most valuable: when markets are tight and the threat of curtailment
is most severe.2
“Excess caution” is not unique to regulated industries, or to natural gas markets. In a
business context, such behavior is sometimes referred to colloquially as CYA (“cover your
ass”) behavior. During the 1980s, when IBM dominated the emerging personal computer
market, this behavior was embodied in a phrase that was known by every corporate pur-
chasing agent: “No one ever got ﬁred for buying IBM.” Taking the risk of purchasing a
diﬀerent brand of PC was seen as having tangible downside for the purchasing agent if
the alternative machine performed poorly, and little upside if it resulted in overall cost
savings.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe in section 2 the relevant institutional details of the
natural gas industry. In section 3 we present a theoretical model of forward and spot
wholesale gas procurement that draws from the institutional setting. Section 4 discusses
empirical tests of the model’s prediction that forward price premia will arise in markets
that are expected to be tight, and section 5 tests the prediction that forward trading
volumes will decrease in tight markets. Section 6 presents some additional, supplementary
evidence, while section 7 concludes and discusses broader implications.
2. The Natural Gas Industry
2.1. Market Structure
The wholesale natural gas industry can be broadly classiﬁed into three main segments:
production, transportation, and local distribution. Natural gas production, which is gener-
ally considered to be competitive,3 occurs mainly in a belt running northwest to southeast
from the Rocky Mountains to the Gulf of Mexico. The demand centers for natural gas,
however, are located primarily in the Northeast, Upper Midwest, and West Coast. Thus,
2 Lyon (1992) models “hindsight review,” the practice of disallowing utilities from recovering fuel costs
if the procurement contract chosen by the utility (forward vs. spot) is ex post not the least expensive
choice. While both models are concerned with choices about spot vs. forward procurement, and both
involve an ex post evaulation by the regulator, the two papers are otherwise about diﬀerent aspects of
the procurement and regulatory review processes.
3 Wellhead natural gas price deregulation began in 1978 with the Natural Gas Policy Act. Prices were
fully de-controlled in 1993 under the Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act.
5a network of interstate gas transmission pipelines has been developed to transport gas to
where it is needed. Each pipeline is a distinct private legal entity, though some entities are
jointly owned by a single holding company.
Interstate natural gas pipelines are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC). According to FERC regulation since 1992, pipelines are not permitted
to buy and sell natural gas; they may only act as the transporter of gas on behalf of their
customers, known as shippers, who hold title to the gas itself. Shippers may be upstream
gas producers, downstream gas consumers, or gas marketers.
Via these transportation arrangements, gas is delivered to wholesale buyers, which are
primarily regulated local distribution companies (LDCs) responsible for gas distribution
to ratepaying customers.4 The LDCs are regulated by state Public Utilities Commissions
(PUCs) with two primary objectives: (1) to ensure reliable gas supply so that customers
will not be interrupted, even during peak demand periods, and (2) to minimize customer
rates while allowing the utility to achieve a reasonable rate of return. The prices LDCs
charge to their customers are regulated through traditional cost-of-service regulation, under
which the wholesale cost of gas supply is passed through to ratepayers, though lags in
regulatory adjustment of retail prices and review of abnormal prices give LDCs incentives
to reduce their natural gas purchase costs.
2.2. An LDC’s Gas Procurement Decision
Given the natural gas market structure, an LDC has numerous gas procurement options
at its disposal. Broadly speaking, it must make its decision along two dimensions: (1)
whether to take ownership of wholesale gas “downstream” at the location of its customers
or at an “upstream” producing location, and (2) how far in advance to procure. We now
consider the institutional aspects of these decisions in turn.
Should the LDC elect to procure gas downstream, its procurement process is relatively
simple–it must contract with a gas supplier for delivery in its local area. In this case, it
does not need to contract for transportation capacity on an interstate pipeline: it is the
responsibility of the gas supplier to ensure transportation to the point of sale. Alterna-
tively, if the LDC arranges for gas delivery in an upstream producing zone, it is then also
responsible for contracting suﬃcient transportation to ship the gas to its local area. In
either case, coordination is necessary amongst the three market participants–the LDC,
the gas seller, and the pipeline–to ensure that the appropriate quantities are delivered
4 Some merchant electric generators and large industrial ﬁrms also purchase gas directly in wholesale
markets.
6at the appropriate times. The diﬃculty of achieving this coordination, which includes
the search costs of ﬁnding a suitable counterparty for each transaction, may be signiﬁ-
cant, particularly in high demand periods when pipelines are operating at their capacity
constraints.5
LDCs also have several options for the timing of their purchases. Day-ahead spot markets
for gas currently operate in approximately 100 locations across the U.S., and are liquid to
varying degrees: while the day-ahead market at Henry Hub in Louisiana (the delivery point
for gas traded under a NYMEX monthly natural gas futures contract) is regarded as deeply
liquid, industry participants have told us that at many locations, ﬁrms may sometimes be
unable to purchase gas on the spot market, particularly in tight market periods, because
liquidity is limited by pipeline capacity constraints and coordination problems. Thus, in a
high demand environment in which spot markets are expected to be tight–for example,
due to cold weather in the Northeast–an LDC faces a risk that it will be unable to procure
gas when it needs it.
As an alternative to participating in day-ahead spot markets, an LDC can also procure
gas in a forward market called the “bidweek” market. “Bidweek” refers to the last ﬁve
trading days of each month. Transactions in this market are for natural gas delivery in
local gas markets for the coming month. Bidweek transactions are for a speciﬁed volume
of gas every day over the month. An LDC could make a bidweek purchase of gas delivered
to its local market, or could combine a bidweek purchase of gas at an upstream location
with transportation rights on a pipeline that can carry the gas to its local market.6 By
purchasing gas in these forward markets, an LDC may avoid reliance on the uncertain
spot markets for its gas supply. LDC’s can also arrange for gas and for transportion with
long-term contracts. In this paper, however, we will be concered with the spot and forward
markets (namely, the bidweek and capacity release markets) described above.
3. A Model of Security of Supply and Excess Caution in Gas Markets
In this section, we model the decisions of natural gas local distribution companies (LDCs)
to purchase natural gas supplies in forward and spot markets. We show that natural gas
5 Apart from the NYMEX natural gas futures market, local natural gas and pipeline capacity markets
are bilateral trading systems without a central market-maker.
6 An LDC may own pipeline transportation rights under a long-term contract, or it can acquire temporary
rights as a “capacity release” from another transportation rights holder. The standard terms for a
capacity release are for the shipment of a speciﬁed volume of gas every day for a calendar month, terms
that parallel the bidweek contract for gas. The capacity relase market is considered in more detail in a
later section.
7markets can exhibit both a forward price that exceeds the expected spot price and reduced
transaction volumes when spot markets are expected to be tight, if two conditions are
met. The ﬁrst condition is that LDCs exhibit “security of supply” concerns, meaning that
having insuﬃcient supplies of gas is more costly than having comparable excess supplies
because the former implies a risk of curtailment. The second condition is that LDCs behave
with “excess caution” in their forward sales, meaning that they do not want to have sold
gas they later needed. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, absent “excess caution,” a
security of supply model alone could be consistent with the presence of forward price
premia in tight markets, but that it alone is unlikely to explain reductions in forward
transaction quantities. Finally, we examine a model of price risk aversion, which also does
not predict a reduction in forward transactions in tight markets, and which, furthermore,
seems inconsistent with the institutional structure of the natural gas industry.
3.1 Supply and Demand Model With Security of Supply
We begin by constructing a model of supply and demand in natural gas markets in which
LDC’s have security of supply concerns because they face asymmetric costs of having too
much vs. too little gas, but in which they do not behave with “excess caution.” Then, in
section 3.2, we add the eﬀect of “excess caution,” namely, a reluctance to sell reserves of
gas that arises from the utility’s desire to keep the regulator from being able to blame it for
a curtailment. (An example of a principal-agent mechanism showing how excess caution
arises is presented in appendix 2.)
Consider a model in which several wholesale gas buyers–LDCs who need to meet end-
use customer demand in the coming month–are present at the downstream end of a
pipeline (a.k.a. the “local market”). As a result of either past purchases or previously
established contracts, the LDCs will hold some “reserves” of gas that can be used to
meet this upcoming demand. “Reserves” may include gas in local storage that the ﬁrm
already owns or has purchase contracts to obtain in the coming month, and also gas located
upstream (that the ﬁrm owns or has contracts to obtain) paired with the necessary pipeline
transportation rights to move the gas to the local market. If the current level of reserves
does not equal the level of supplies that the ﬁrm would ultimately like to have on hand
in the coming month given the anticipated customer demand, then the ﬁrm can use the
forward or spot markets to buy additional gas or sell its excess supply.
In the model, customer demand varies exogenously due to weather and other shocks,
and is extremely inelastic in the short run. This closely mirrors reality in natural gas
markets, where prices for end-use customers are determined by regulators, and change
infrequently and with a lag. As a result, LDCs cannot rely on end-use price response to
8reconcile customer demand with their supplies.
We assume for now that LDCs are risk neutral with respect to price–an issue to which
we return in section 3.3–and model LDCs’ demand for wholesale gas given that they
face asymmetric costs of mismatching their supplies of gas to realized customer demand.
Speciﬁcally, shortfalls, which result in curtailment of end-use customers, are much more
costly than excess supplies, which are generally storable at some location. This asymmetry
leads an LDC’s demand curve for supplies of gas during any given month to be convex:
the marginal value of supplies is very high for units up to the realized customer demand
that the LDC faces, and ﬂattens out rapidly for units beyond that level. Figure 1 shows
hypothetical marginal valuation curves for supplies of gas in a particular delivery month
once the demand shock has been realized (and ﬁnal customer demand is known).7
If an LDC could always be certain that it could adjust its level of supplies to exactly
match its customers’ demand through use of the spot market, this asymmetry would be
of no consequence.8 However, we have been told by many market participants that the
– market for natural gas is sometimes not suﬃciently liquid for LDCs to be certain that
they can buy or sell the quantities they wish to trade. For this reason, LDCs procure
most of their supplies in the forward markets, usually between one week and six months
in advance.
Forward prices if no spot market were available. If LDCs turn to the forward market
because of concerns about an illiquid spot market, how does that aﬀect the forward market
equilibrium? In order to highlight the role of spot market access in the answer to this
question, we ﬁrst consider the extreme case in which an LDC has no access to a spot
market, meaning that no adjustments are feasible after demand shocks are revealed. In
this case, an LDC must buy whatever gas it needs in the forward market, before the
retail state of demand is completely known. When facing the prospect of buying (or
selling) in the forward market, the LDC’s marginal valuation for each unit of gas will be
the weighted average of the marginal valuations it would have for that unit of gas under
7 Though the eﬀect appears to be similar, the convexity of the marginal valuation curve here is not due
to risk aversion. The ﬁrm and its decisionmakers are assumed to exhibit a constant marginal valuation
of wealth. Rather, the asymmetry in monetary payoﬀs from excess versus insuﬃcient supplies yields
the convex marginal valuation curve.
8 For example, consider the case of a long-distance trucking ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm were to have insuﬃcient
fuel, it would cripple the ﬁrm’s ability to perform. However, long-distance trucking ﬁrms can rely on
a dense, geographically diverse, and very reliable spot market for fuel in the form of gas stations and
truck stops. They do not need to make forward purchases of fuel in order to avoid security of supply
risk. Thus, if the input spot market is suﬃciently thick, we expect that it would be a good substitute
for the forward market, even for ﬁrms that have security of supply concerns.
9all possible retail demand shock realizations. Figure 2 illustrates a hypothetical forward
marginal valuation curve, ¯ D(q), if there were two equally likely retail demand realizations,
D(q,w1)a n dD(q,w2) where w1 and w2 represent high and low demand shocks (due, for
example, to cold and warm weather). We use the term marginal valuation curve, rather
than demand curve, to emphasize the fact that the LDC may either buy or sell in the
forward market, depending on the level of reserves it controls coming into this market.
This point is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. Suppose that a hypothetical ﬁrm has qres in reserves
as it comes into the forward market. If the price in the forward market is above the ﬁrm’s
marginal valuation at its current level of reserves, qres, the ﬁrm will want to sell reserves
according to the ¯ D(q) schedule. If the forward price is below this level, the ﬁrm will want
to buy. That is, the ﬁrm’s ¯ D(q) becomes part of the market supply curve for prices above
¯ D(qres) and part of the market demand curve for prices below ¯ D(qres).
Figure 4 illustrates hypothetical supply and demand curves for ﬁrms that are holding
diﬀerent levels of reserves relative to their expected needs. Panel (a) shows supply and
demand curves for two ﬁrms with abundant reserves relative to the expected demand
realization. These are ﬁrms that would be likely to have excess supply for the current
period if they were to continue with their current level of reserves; the supply and demand
curves are therefore relatively ﬂat, up to the point where the ﬁrm is considering selling a
large amount of reserves. Panel (b) shows two ﬁrms with low levels of reserves relative
to expected demand. These are ﬁrms that would be more likely to experience shortage if
they were to continue with their current level of reserves. These ﬁrms have steeper demand
and especially supply curves, reﬂecting a much higher possibility of curtailment than for
the ﬁrms in panel (a). (The market supply and demand curves in the forward market are
obtained by aggregating the individual supply and demand curves, such as those depicted
in ﬁgure 4, across the ﬁrms in the market.)
How will an LDC’s purchases or sales of gas on the forward market in this case diﬀer
from what it would choose in the spot market, were the spot market available to it?
In appendix 1, we show that convexity of the marginal valuation curves–in conjunction
with another plausible, though not general, condition on the functions–ensures that the
quantity that the LDC would choose to acquire in the forward market, through purchase
or sale, at a given forward price p will be larger than the expected quantity it would choose
to purchase in the spot market (were the spot market available to it) at the same price
p.O r , e q u i v a l e n t l y , i f E(q) is the LDC’s expected spot market demand at spot price p,
the LDC’s marginal value of reserves in the forward market at quantity E(q), namely
¯ D(E(q)), will be greater than p. Figure 5 illustrates these relationships for a hypothetical
example. The intuition of this result is that the asymmetric costs of shortage versus excess
10supply–reﬂected in the convexity of the marginal value curve–gives strong incentives to
purchase more than will be needed on average in order to minimize the expected costs of
supply/demand mismatches. As discussed in appendix 1, when the marginal valuations of
all LDCs in the market share this property, in equilibrium the forward price can exceed
the expected price that would occur in the spot market, were the spot market available.
Forward prices if spot market may be available. What happens if, contrary to what we
have assumed so far, the LDCs do have access to a spot market? If the spot market is
suﬃciently liquid that an LDC can always rely on spot market transactions to supply any
additional gas it needs during the delivery month (or provide buyers for any excess gas),
then no LDC would ever purchase in the forward market at a premium over (or sell at a
discount to) the expected spot price, so the forward price, pf, would equal the expected
spot price, ¯ p. Suppose, however, that there is some chance that an LDC will not be able
to utilize the spot market, perhaps because the spot market is thin and the LDC may
not be able to ﬁnd a counterparty with whom to trade within the necessary time frame.
If the LDC is unable to buy in the spot market, the loss associated with the purchasing
failure is equal to the expected marginal valuation of the gas that the LDC did not get
to buy. Thus, in the forward market, the LDCs would be willing to pay no more than
the weighted average of the expected spot price (what it will pay if it can access the spot
market) and the expected marginal valuation (what it will lose if it cannot access the spot
market), where the weights are the probabilities of being able to access the spot market or
not. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 6. If the demand conditions discussed above (and in the
appendix) are present, then the willingness to pay in the forward market for the expected
quantity the ﬁrm would purchase at a particular spot price will still exceed that spot price.
In this way, security of supply concerns can lead to a premium in the forward price over
the expected spot price.
The model we have presented so far indicates not only that a forward premium can exist,
but also that its size is likely to vary with the expected tightness of the gas market. If all
or most market participants have plenty of reserves on hand in anticipation of upcoming
needs, then the market supply and demand curves will be relatively ﬂat at a level very close
to the expected spot price, ¯ p. (Furthermore, ¯ p will also be very close to the carry-forward
value of gas; namely, the expected spot price next period minus marginal storage cost).
If, however, the spot market is expected to be tight, then many participants’ qres will be
at a point where their marginal value is far enough above the expected spot price that–
considering the risk of being unable to transact in the spot market–they are willing to pay
(or only willing to accept) a price that is signiﬁcantly above the expected spot price. These
11two diﬀerent situations are illustrated in ﬁgure 7.9 This is not a proof that the forward
premium would necessarily increase with market tightness, but the theory suggests that is
a likely outcome.
Forward quantities. As explained earlier, we are interested in studying both prices and
transaction volumes in the forward market. The model presented so far also helps to
analyze the impact that security of supply concerns will have on volumes. If each market
participant has a forward market marginal value function ˆ D(q) and an initial endowment
of gas qres, then if the equilibrium forward price is pf, each participant will want to buy or
sell a quantity ∆q in the forward market until the marginal value at its resulting level of
reserves is equal to the market price, ˆ D(qres+∆q)=pf. From a market-wide perspective,
the trading volume will be that which equalizes the marginal valuations of all market
participants; i.e., , volume is equal to the mismatch between the initial reserve allocation
and the eﬃcient equilibrium allocation after the forward market has cleared.10
For three reasons, which we discuss in more detail in the appendix, we expect that
the mismatch between ﬁrms’ initial and equilibrium allocations will be greater, and the
trading volume therefore also greater, at times when the spot market is expected to be
tight: (a) tight markets are associated with a larger overall gas market due to high demand,
which will tend to scale up the size of the mismatch (scale eﬀect); (b) tight markets are
associated with weather shocks that impact neighboring areas heterogeneously and change
the need for reserves unevenly because some ﬁrms now need much more gas, but others
do not (heterogeneity eﬀect); and (c) any transaction cost of trading is more likely to be
overcome at peak times because high demand shocks will shift marginal value functions
to the right, increasing the likelihood that the current level of reserves a ﬁrm holds lies
9 The same argument suggests that while the asymmetric costs of insuﬃcient versus excess supplies tends
to create a forward premium when markets are tight due to concerns about security of supply, it does
not create a forward discount when markets are loose due to concerns about “security of demand.” It is
indeed the case that in loose spot markets, a seller of reserves might be unable to ﬁnd a buyer, but the
loss from failing to complete a transaction will be minimal. While an LDC that is short of reserves may
be desperate to procure supplies in order to prevent customer curtailments, an LDC that has excess
reserves will not be desperate to sell. Its downside risk is limited to foregoing potential revenue from
selling the reserves at the market price. In most cases, it could simply carry the reserves forward to the
next period. As a result, the supply curve is relatively elastic (as illustrated in panel (a) of ﬁgure 4),
implying small surplus gains from making a sale. In addition, because sellers are also mostly regulated
LDCs who pass their net gas procurement costs through to end-use customers, the ﬁnancial risk for the
LDC itself is limited even further.
10 Stated more precisely, the trading volume is the sum of the diﬀerences between the initial allocation
and the eﬃcient equilibrium allocation over all ﬁrms whose initial allocations exceed their equilibrium
allocation. This will also equal the sum of the diﬀerences between the equilibrium allocation and the
initial allocation over all ﬁrms whose initial allocation is less than their equilibrium allocation. In other
words, total sales are equal to total purchases are equal to the total volume of trade.
12in the steep portion of the marginal valuation curve, thereby making greater marginal
value diﬀerences between buyers and sellers more likely (transaction cost eﬀect). While we
don’t know the magnitudes of these eﬀects, they all imply greater forward market volume
when demand is expected to be high and spot markets are therefore expected to be tight.
Together, they suggest that the security of supply model alone would not be consistent
with a ﬁnding of decreased volume during tight-market periods.11
3.2 “Excess Caution” Induced By A Principal-Agent Mechanism
While the model of “security of supply” does oﬀer insights into the eﬀect of asymmetric
costs of shortages versus surplus supplies, it does not yet capture one of the institutional
aspects of gas utility regulation that has been expressed or conﬁrmed to us by all of the
participants we have interviewed: regulatory oversight in the retail natural gas market re-
sults in especially harsh treatment of an LDC that sells supplies it had in reserve and then
ﬁnds itself in a shortage situation and in need of those supplies. The underlying reason for
such a penalty in this industry is most likely political. The regulator is ultimately account-
able to the governor and legislature, and they in turn are accountable to their constituents.
While curtailments will attract customer ire whenever they occur (hence the convexity of
the marginal valuation curve), the political fallout will be much greater if a utility had
necessary reserves and then sold them, which ex post looks like “proﬁteering,” than if the
utility can argue that it made a “good faith eﬀort” to acquire additional supplies, but that
the market was simply too thin or the coordination problems too diﬃcult to surmount in
a short period of time. Where the political fallout is greatest, the political pressure on
regulators will be greatest, and so, therefore, will the regulator’s punishment of the utility
be harshest. Although these punishments are not easily speciﬁed, nor are they written
in formal rules, it is clear that the utilities believe they are real. One utility executive
told us with regards to this issue, “[Avoiding] regret is the prime mover” in dealing with
regulators.12 The resulting incentive is for utilities to exercise “excess caution” by holding
onto reserves rather than selling them, so as not to be demonstrably blameworthy for a
shortfall.
11 These arguments focus on buyers and sellers of physical gas, as opposed to price speculators who plan to
unwind their positions in the spot market instead of completing the forward agreement. To the extent
that speculators are present in these markets, it seems likely that they too would be more active in
tight-market periods when there is more price volatility and the value of superior market information
is greater.
12 Although the circumstances are quite diﬀerent, the blackouts during the California electricity crisis and
the subsequent recall of Governor Gray Davis suggest that the political consequences of perceptions of
poor oversight of public utilities can indeed have substantial political consequences.
13We can represent this feature of the market graphically with a penalty function that
raises the reservation price at which an LDC would sell reserves in the forward market if
there is a risk it will then have to procure supplies in the spot market in order to meet its
own demand. The expected penalty, and associated increase in the reservation price in the
forward market, is greater if the LDC is more likely to have to buy quantities back in the
spot market. This likelihood is a decreasing function of its starting reserve position and an
increasing function of the quantity of gas it sells in the forward market. We illustrate two
scenarios in ﬁgure 8, where in each case ˆ D(q) represents the willingness to buy and sell
in the forward market absent the regulatory penalty, and ˜ D(q) is the willingness to buy
and sell in the forward market inclusive of the regulatory penalty. In ﬁgure 8a, the LDC
has plentiful supplies and could sell substantial quantities in the forward market before
the expected value of the penalty would become non-negligible. In ﬁgure 8b, however, the
LDC is in a tighter reserve position and is more likely to need to purchase supplies in
the spot market. In this case, selling even a small quantity in the forward market creates
a signiﬁcant probability that the LDC will incur regulatory punishment. Note that this
creates a discontinuity in the marginal value of reserves at the LDC’s starting reserve
position.
The regulatory penalty causes ﬁrms’ supply curves, such as those illustrated in ﬁgure 4,
to shift up while having no eﬀect on their demand curves. The result is a larger forward
p r e m i u m ,a n dt h ee ﬀ e c ti sm u c hm o r el i k e l yt oo c c u rw h e ns u p p l i e sa r ee x p e c t e dt ob e
tight. In fact, in a loose market with plentiful supplies, the penalty threat will likely have
no eﬀect.
A second result of the penalty threat is to lower volume in the forward market when the
threat of the regulatory penalty is most salient. We argued in the previous subsection that,
absent such a regulatory penalty, an expectation of tight spot markets implies a forward
trading volume as large as or larger than the forward trading volume when spot markets
are expected to be loose. However, the asymmetry of the regulatory penalty–among any
LDCs who end up with insuﬃcient supplies in the spot market, it will aﬀect only those
who sold gas in the forward market–acts to discourage eﬃcient forward trade when spot
markets are expected to be tight. A suﬃciently large penalty could eliminate all trade in
the forward market at times when LDCs perceive a real risk of a severe demand shock and
tight gas market.13
13 Since reduced volume and higher prices are often a hallmark of market power, and since a tight forward
market also suggests a reduced number of market participants, one might wonder whether market power
in local markets might be an alternative explanation. Market power might exacerbate the eﬀect if a
reduced number of participants in the forward market gives ﬁrms the opportunity to exercise (or more
14One might wonder why the regulator would impose a penalty threat that causes the LDC
to forego eﬃcient trades in the forward market and instead exercise “excess caution.”
In appendix 2, we show that, in a principal-agent framework in which the principal is
uncertain of the agent’s ability to trade eﬃciently on its behalf, an optimizing principal
may want to impose a penalty on ex post unfavorable outcomes of an action, but not of an
inaction. The principal may prefer to do so even though the policy would in equilibrium
lead to “excess caution.” This is not to say that the regulatory penalty that LDCs claim
to face in the natural gas industry is necessarily the result of optimizing behavior, but that
it is also not necessarily irrational.
In the discussion of security of supply and excess caution we have focused on the behavior
of local distribution companies that purchase for resale to residential, commericial and
industrial end users. Some large industrial gas consumers, however, do not buy through
LDCs, but instead participate in the wholesale gas market directly. This includes electricity
generating companies as well as energy-intensive manufacturers, such as cement producers.
Because gas is a critical input to their production processes, these companies are also likely
to have convex marginal value functions. The regulatory penalty discussion would not
apply directly, but equivalent principal/agent conﬂict inside the ﬁrm could yield excessively
cautious behavior. A manager responsible for gas procurement could face very similar
incentives not to resell reserves, even at a high incremental proﬁt to the ﬁrm, if there is
even a small probability that the ﬁrm will end up needing the gas and be unable to procure
it on the spot market.
3.3. Price Risk Aversion
Thus far, we have assumed that the market participants are risk neutral with respect to
price. However, price risk aversion could also aﬀect the relationship between the spot and
forward markets. Buyers and sellers who are risk averse will be willing to give up some
expected surplus in a transaction in order to reduce the price volatility they face. If buyers
are systematically more willing to pay to reduce price uncertainty than are sellers, then
the observed forward transaction prices can be greater on average than the associated spot
prices.14
Risk aversion over prices, however, is not as compelling an explanation for a forward
eﬀectively exercise) market power by witholding quantity to drive up price. However, there has to be
some reason for fewer LDC’s to be willing to participate in a forward market when spot prices are
expected to be high. We don’t see a route whereby market power alone would have this eﬀect.
14 See Dusak (1973), Bodie and Rosansky (1980) and Carter, Rausser and Schmitz (1983) for a more
thorough discussion of risk premia in eﬃcient and liquid commodity markets.
15price premium in these markets as it might at ﬁrst appear. First, recall that buyers and
sellers in downstream gas markets are generally the same ﬁrms. A holder of a certain
quantity of long-term gas delivery contracts will sometimes ﬁnd itself in need of more, and
thus buy on the local gas market, and at other times ﬁnd itself with excess supply and
therefore sell on these markets. It is diﬃcult to argue that buyers are systematically more
averse to price volatility risk than sellers when the same set of players occupy both sides
of the market at various times. In addition, the LDCs that are buying and selling in this
market are generally allowed to pass through nearly all of their gas acquisition costs to
their customers, so we would not expect them to exhibit much price risk aversion.
While these institutional factors reduce the likelihood that risk aversion is a factor in
these markets, we still assess its implications for the relationship between forward and spot
prices, and in the quantity of trades. A simple model demonstrates how price risk aversion
could aﬀect the market. Assuming that there is a common distribution of beliefs about
the probability distribution of the spot price, with an expected spot price of ¯ p, risk-averse
buyers will be willing to pay more than ¯ p to hedge their purchase costs in the forward
market and risk-averse sellers will be will to receive less than ¯ p in order to hedge their
sales revenues in the forward market. Risk-neutral participants stand ready in the forward
market to buy at any price below ¯ p and sell at any price above ¯ p. Finally, risk-averse
speculative buyers would only buy in the forward market if they could do so at a price
below ¯ p a n dr i s k - a v e r s es p e c u l a t i v es e l l e r sw o u l do n l ys e l li nt h ef o r w a r dm a r k e ti ft h e y
c o u l dd os oa tap r i c ea b o v e¯ p.15
A hypothetical forward market with large numbers of risk-neutral buyers and sellers is
illustrated in ﬁgure 9 by the Df and Sf curves. To the left, downward sloping demand at
prices above ¯ p represents diﬀerences in risk aversion among hedging buyers. To the right,
downward sloping demand at prices below ¯ p represents diﬀerences in risk aversion among
speculative buyers. On the supply curve, risk-averse hedging sellers are on the left and
risk-averse speculative sellers are on the right. We assume there is a very small positive
trading charge so that risk-neutral buyers and sellers do not trade with one another. With
a large number of risk-neutral traders, supply and demand will intersect at a price near ¯ p,
with the marginal trade very likely occurring between a risk-neutral seller and a hedging
buyer, or between a risk-neutral buyer and hedging seller. (Figure 9 depicts the latter
15 We carry out this analysis considering the variance of spot price as the relevant measure of risk. If the
participants could actively engage in diversiﬁcation of this risk, then the CAPM would apply and only
the non-diversiﬁable risk would be relevant. Given that we are considering local gas markets, this seems
less plausible. Still, the analysis goes through unchanged with substitution of non-diversiﬁable risk for
total risk.
16case.) In equilibrium, hedgers on both sides of the market are able to lock in a price in
advance while sacriﬁcing essentially no expected surplus. Risk-averse speculators do not
ﬁnd any attractive trading opportunities and do not trade in the market.
Note that for a given ¯ p, if the variance of the expected spot price distribution changes,
the willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept of the risk averse market participants will
change, but not of the risk-neutral players. An increase in spot price variance causes the
risk premia that market participants are willing to pay or risk discounts that they are
willing to accept to increase. So, the parts of the supply and demand curves that are not
ﬂat become even steeper, as illustrated by the dashed lines in ﬁgure 9, D￿
f and S￿
f.T h e
volume of trade will be essentially unchanged, and there still will be no signiﬁcant forward
p r e m i u mo rd i s c o u n t .
Now consider the forward market in the absence of risk-neutral traders. The ﬂat areas
of supply and demand that were in ﬁgure 9 disappear. In ﬁgure 10, the demand curve
above ¯ p is made up of hedging buyers and below ¯ p consists of speculative buyers. The
reverse is true of the supply curve; hedging sellers are below ¯ p and speculative sellers are
above ¯ p. Figure 10 shows a situation in which the equilibrium price in the forward market
happens to equal the expected spot price. In this special case, an increase in spot price
volatility leaves the forward premium unchanged at zero. Both the supply and demand
curves get steeper, but they rotate around ¯ p so the equilibrium price and trade volume are
unchanged.
Figure 11 illustrates the situation in which supply and demand for forward trades from
risk-averse participants, combined with the absence of risk-neutral participants, results in
a forward premium.16 On the margin, speculators on the sell side of the forward market are
transacting with hedgers on the buy side. In such a situation, an increase in the volatility
of the spot market will rotate the supply and demand curves around the ¯ p line and will
increase the forward premium.17 Thus, an increase in spot price volatility could increase
a forward premium that is already present in the market.
The price risk aversion model, however, has a diﬀerent prediction for the forward trade
volume than our model of security of supply with excess caution. In a simple mean-variance
utility model, the increase in spot price volatility would rotate the forward demand and
16 This outcome could also occur if there were risk-neutral traders as long as they in aggregate were not
willing to supply or demand a large quantity relative to the market.
17 And conversely, if the forward market displays a discount to the expected spot price, an increase in the
spot market volatility will increase the size of the forward discount.
17supply curves upward (for prices above ¯ p) by exactly the same proportion. This follows
immediately from the assumption that the disutility of spot price variance changes linearly
with the variance. In this case, the change in spot price volatility has no impact on forward
market volume. The same two traders as before would be on the margin. All traders who
were in the market at the lower volatility level would still be in when the expected volatility
of the spot market increases, and all those who were out would still be out.
In a more complex model of the impact of risk on utility–such as a model in which utility
is a higher-order polynomial function of spot price variance–this would not necessarily be
the case. However, deviations from the volume-neutrality of changes in spot price volatility
would depend on higher-order terms in the utility model causing the supply and demand
curves to rotate upward by diﬀerent proportions around the equilibrium. The sign of such
a change in volume would be ambiguous. Even in that case, however, the volume would
almost certainly be bounded between the quantities at which the supply and demand
curves cross ¯ p.18
While the theoretical model of price risk aversion narrows substantially the range in
which forward market volume may vary with the expected tightness of the spot gas market,
two factors not explicitly modeled suggest that volume is likely to increase when the spot
market is expected to be tight. These two factors are similar to those that aﬀect volume in
the security of supply model. The ﬁrst is again a scale eﬀect: if the gas market is larger at
times when demand is high and the spot market is expected to be tight, the demand and
supply of hedging or speculating traders in the forward market is likely to scale up with
market size, increasing the total volume of trade. The second factor is a possible need to
overcome transaction costs. As illustrated in ﬁgures 9, 10 and 11, increases in volatility
that are associated with a tight gas market increase the slope of supply and demand in
the forward market. Transaction costs act like a tax, creating a strictly positive minimum
surplus gain necessary to justify a transaction. Increases in volatility will therefore cause
the gains from trade to exceed the transaction costs more frequently, driving an increase
in trading volume.
Overall, price risk aversion–the most common explanation for forward-spot expected
price diﬀerences in ﬁnance–seems unlikely to explain a signiﬁcant forward premium in
this instance for institutional reasons. Still, if forward premia in the natural gas industry
are caused by price risk aversion, theory suggests that the premia could very well increase
with expected volatility in the spot market: a condition that would be expected to occur
18 This requires that the slopes of the supply and demand curve do not change signs and that changes in
spot price volatility do not induce a hedger to become a speculator or vice versa.
18when supplies are expected to be tight. However, the same theory would be hard-pressed
to explain a signiﬁcant decline in forward transaction volumes at such times.
3.4. Theory Summary
We have presented three models of forward market transactions in the wholesale natu-
ral gas market. All three models–security of supply concerns, regulatory/organizational
incentives for excess caution, and price risk aversion–can predict a forward market price
premium that increases with the expected tightness of the spot market for gas. For insti-
tutional reasons, however, the price risk aversion model seems relatively unlikely to apply
in this setting.
The implications of the models for transaction volumes diﬀerentiate them more dis-
tinctly. Security of supply concerns, absent excess caution, suggest that forward volume
will increase when the spot market is expected to be tight. Forward volumes are also likely
to increase in such markets if price risk aversion is important. Though it is diﬃcult to
infer under either model the degree to which volume would be expected to increase, neither
seems consistent with a signiﬁcant drop in forward market volumes when spot markets are
expected to be tight. This inconsistency contrasts with the prediction of the excess caution
model. The excess caution theory predicts that a regulatory penalty for selling reserves
just before a shortage will reduce forward volume when the market is expected to be tight.
4. Evidence of forward price premia
In this section, we examine the ﬁrst of the theoretical implications, that forward prices
should exceed expected spot prices when spot markets are expected to be tight. We do this
by comparing forward prices to spot prices in local markets for natural gas. While a forward
premium that is higher when spot markets are expected to be tight does not distinguish
a m o n g s tt h et h r e em o d e l s ,i td o e se s t a b l i s ht h a tm a r k e tb e h a v i o ri si n c o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
presumption of eﬃcient forward markets that are unbiased predictors of spot prices. In
section 5, we attempt to distinguish amongst the theories we have presented by examining
data regarding forward trading quantities.
4.1 Local natural gas markets–data
Price data for local natural gas markets are sourced from Platts’ GASdat product, and
consist of location-speciﬁc observations in the day-ahead (spot) markets and the forward
month (“bidweek”) markets. Platts obtains prices in spot markets via surveys of trades
made at each location and reports average location-speciﬁc spot prices at daily intervals.
19Bidweek data occur on a monthly basis and represent the volume-weighted average price
o fa l ls u r v e y e dt r a d e st h a to c c u ra te a c hl o c a t i o nd u r i n gb i d w e e k . B i d w e e kt a k e sp l a c e
over the last ﬁve trading days of each month and consists of trades for gas to be delivered
during the following month.19
Because our aim is to compare forward prices to spot prices, we must make the daily
spot data compatible with the monthly bidweek data. We therefore average the daily spot
observations within each location and month to obtain an average spot price for the month,
and proceed at this level of aggregation for the remainder of the paper.20 There exist 11,169
location-months for which both spot and bidweek prices exist,21 spread over 131 locations
across which the duration of coverage varies. For example, while data for Henry Hub
in Louisiana span 1993 to 2007, data at the Carthage Hub in northeast Texas are only
available for 1997 to 2002. These variations in data availability occur because trading
activity in some locations varies over time, and Platts does not record observations when
there are an insuﬃcient number of trades to allow it to determine the average price.
Summary statistics for the spot and bidweek prices are shown in table 1. Both data
series are highly right-skewed, as indicated by the excess of the mean over the median
prices and by the large observed maximum prices. The summary statistics of the spot and
bidweek prices are very similar, and the diﬀerence in means of 0.8 cents is not statistically
signiﬁcant.22 Thus, on average, there is no statistically discernible forward premium or
discount in prices for natural gas. This result, however, does not speak to whether forward
premia develop when the market is expected to be tight, a topic to which we now turn.
4.2 Local natural gas markets–empirical framework
Our working hypothesis is that the forward price premium should rise when LDCs believe
that they may be unable to obtain gas in the spot market due to supply constraints
19 Platts will sometimes use the median of reported prices if it ﬁnds that one high-volume transaction skews
its bidweek sample. Unfortunately, there are no indicators in the data to determine which observations
are computed in this way.
20 We use a straight average of the daily spot prices, rather than a volume-weighted average, because the
straight average better reﬂects the nature of bidweek transactions, which specify a ﬁxed volume of gas
to be delivered every day of the month.
21 The count of 11,169 location-months includes only those observations for which rolling regression spot
price predictions can ultimately be generated, as discussed later. Without this restriction, there are
17,438 location-months.
22 Statistical signiﬁcance was tested via a paired t-test with standard errors clustered on year-month: the
t-statistic is 0.15.
20or coordination problems, a situation we have been calling a “tight” spot market. A
natural measure of whether the spot market is expected to be tight is the expected spot
price, because natural gas is most valuable precisely when access to it is diﬃcult. Natural
gas supply in local markets exhibits signiﬁcant short-run constraints due to limited local
storage and limited capacity to bring in additional gas by pipeline. In addition, the overall
U.S. natural gas market can exhibit short-term supply constraints due to constraints on
production rates at natural gas wells.23 These factors lead the natural gas supply function
in any period (distinct from the forward supply curve discussed in the previous section) to
be relatively elastic up to the binding supply limits and then very inelastic at those limits,
a familiar inverted L-shape supply curve. Thus, an expectation of a high spot market price
(controlling for historical levels and recent trends) will coincide with an expectation that
equilibrium is likely to occur on the inelastic portion of the supply curve, which is what
happens when the market encounters a supply constraint–a tight market.24
To test our hypothesis that forward price premia will occur when spot markets are
expected to be tight, we wish to estimate the parameters of the following equation:
BidWeekit − Spotit = β0 + β1 E[Spotit]+µi + g(t)+ it. [1]
Here, BidWeekit is the price during bidweek of month t − 1 for gas to be delivered at
location i in month t,a n dSpotit is the spot price for gas at location i in month t. E[Spotit]
is the expectation at the beginning of bidweek in month t−1 of the spot price at location
i in month t.T h eµi are location ﬁxed eﬀects and g(t) is a 4th-order polynomial in time
that controls for the secular upward trend in natural gas prices over the sample period.
If forward price premia arise when the market is expected to be tight, then β1 will be
positive.
In order to estimate equation [1] directly, we would have to observe E[Spotit]. Because
we do not observe market participants’ expectations of spot prices for a particular month,
we must take an indirect approach. We begin by noting that markets for natural gas are
markets in which the same participants operate month after month, that the participants
are professional traders and purchasing agents, and that the transactions are for sizeable
23 These constraints are indicated by increases in natural gas futures prices during the winter months; gas
production is unable to fully respond to seasonal demand swings.
24 At constrained times, a shift in demand due to weather or other exogenous shocks will also create larger
changes in price than at unconstrained times. Thus, tight markets and high expected spot prices will
also be associated with greater expected price volatility; i.e., price risk.
21monetary values. Under these circumstances, we expect that market participants’ expec-
tation of the spot price will be an unbiased predictor of the realized spot price. That
is, market participants will incorporate all available information into their expectations
so that any diﬀerence between their expectation and the realized spot price will be due
to information revealed after expectations are formed. This information will therefore be
orthogonal to the information that is incorporated into the expected spot price:
Spotit = E[Spotit]+ξit. [2]
Using equation [2], we can estimate equation [1] by substituting Spotit for E[Spotit]a n d
accounting for the endogeneity introduced by ξit:
BidWeekit − Spotit = β0 + β1 Spotit + µi + g(t)+(  it − β1ξit). [3]
Using Spotit as a right-hand-side regressor introduces both classical measurement error
and simultaneity bias, since the dependent variable is BidWeekit −Spotit.I no r d e rt ou s e
Spotit as a regressor, we need an instrument that is correlated with the realized spot price
but uncorrelated with the error ( it − β1ξit).
As an instrument, we construct a forecast of the spot market price that is based on
information available to us and determined prior to the bidweek market in period t−1. To
illustrate our approach, suppose we wish to forecast the spot price at the Chicago Citygate
in November 2001, using information available to traders at the start of bidweek in October
(October bidweek is when forward contracts are set for delivery in November). We cannot,
of course, use the bidweek price itself to create the forecast, as our aim is to test for bias
in the bidweek price during tight market periods. Instead, we construct the forecast using
two additional pieces of information: (1) the NYMEX futures price of gas at Henry Hub,
Louisiana, for delivery in November 2001, priced at the start of bidweek;25 and (2) the
spot price diﬀerential from Henry Hub to Chicago, also priced at the start of bidweek. The
former yields a measure of the expected price of gas at Henry Hub in November, which
will be correlated with November prices nationwide, while the latter measures the price
25 A NYMEX (New York Mercantile Exchange) futures contract speciﬁes a price for delivery of gas for a
calendar month at the Henry Hub pipeline interconnect and storage facility in Louisiana. Because of
the deep liquidity of both the NYMEX futures market and the Henry Hub spot market, and the fact
that the vast majority of NYMEX market participants have no intention of taking physical delivery of
gas, NYMEX futures prices are not subject to security of supply concerns that might drive a forward
price premium in tight markets. Thus, we may use the NYMEX futures market to generate unbiased
forecasts of Henry Hub spot prices.
22diﬀerential to Chicago near the end of October, which will be correlated with the price
diﬀerential in November.26
More generally, for all locations and months in our data, we forecast the expected spot
price for location i in month t using the equation [4] below, in which FutureHH,t is the
NYMEX futures price for delivery at Henry Hub in month t, taken at the start of bidweek
in month t − 1; Spoti,t−1 is the spot price at location i at the start of bidweek in month
t − 1; and the di are location ﬁxed eﬀects.
SpotForecastit =a0 + a1 Future HH,t + a2 [Spoti,t−1 − SpotHenryHub,t−1]+di [4]
To use equation [4] to predict expected spot prices, we must ﬁrst estimate the equation’s
parameters–a0, a1, a2,a n dt h edi–by running the regression speciﬁed in equation [5]
below. This equation includes an unobserved orthogonal disturbance νit to account for
information revealed between the start of bidweek in month t − 1a n dm o n t ht.
Spotit =α0 + α1 FutureHH,t + α2 [Spoti,t−1 − SpotHenryHub,t−1]+δi + νit [5]
In the process of estimating equation [5] and then generating forecasts using equation
[4], we take care to avoid using any future information in our forecasts. That is, when we
forecast the spot price for month t using equation [4], we only use parameters estimated
using information revealed prior to month t−1. This means that we do not use our entire
sample of spot price information to produce estimates of the α’s and δi’s from equation
[5], and then apply these estimated parameters to generate a full time series of prices from
equation [4].
Instead, we estimate equation [5] using a “rolling regression” approach. Rather than
estimate a single set of ˆ α’s, we estimate a diﬀerent coeﬃcient vector ˆ αt =(ˆ α0t, ˆ α1t, ˆ α2t, ˆ δt)
for each month t using data only up to month t−2. These coeﬃcients are then substituted
for the corresponding a’s and d in equation [4] to generate expected spot prices for month
t. While this approach ensures that our spot price prediction for any month t does not
include any information revealed after t, it does come with the cost that there are few data
with which to estimate equation [5] in the early part of our sample. To avoid generating
26 As an alternative to our instrumental variables approach, we could replace E[Spotit] in equation [1]
directly with our forecast of spot price. However, doing so would cause the standard errors we estimate
to be biased downwards (Murphy and Topel, 1985).
23estimates based upon only a handful of points, we predict spot prices only for locations and
months for which the coeﬃcient vector in [5] was estimated using at least 24 observations.27
4.3 Local natural gas markets–results
We ﬁrst report results from the estimation of equation [5]–the ﬁrst stage regression
we use to create forecasts of spot prices. For illustration, the ﬁrst column of table 2
reports results using the full sample of spot price data. Our two primary determinants of
spot price are the NYMEX future price and the spot price diﬀerential from Henry Hub
to each location. The estimated coeﬃcients of these variables are positive, as expected,
and statistically signiﬁcant with location ﬁxed eﬀects and standard errors clustered on
year-month. The NYMEX futures price and the spot price diﬀerential clearly carry useful
information with which to predict current prices.
Table 2 also reports the results of rolling regressions of equation [5]. We ran 174 rolling
regressions to generate parameters for the forecast of spot prices from February 1993 to
July 2007. The estimated coeﬃcient on the NYMEX future price is positive in every
regression, and the estimated coeﬃcient on the price diﬀerential is positive for 168 of 174.
We use these estimated rolling regression parameters to forecast spot prices using equation
[4], and then use these forecasts as instruments for spot price in our main speciﬁcation,
equation [3].
The results of estimating equation [3] are reported in table 3. The results presented
in column 1 are those obtained through the estimation of [3] as written. Column 2 adds
month-of-year ﬁxed eﬀects, and column 3 adds interactions between location ﬁxed eﬀects
and a linear time trend. Across all three speciﬁcations, we estimate that the forward
premium of bidweek prices over spot prices increases systematically with the expected
spot price. The point estimates indicate that a $1.00 rise in the expected spot price (as
measured by the instrumented spot price) is predicted to cause a $0.20 to $0.21 rise in the
forward premium, depending on the empirical speciﬁcation.
The p-values for the results in columns 1 through 3 are 0.094, 0.066, and 0.064, re-
spectively, with standard errors that are clustered on year-month.28 While clustering the
27 There is a tradeoﬀ in setting the minimum number of observations required to estimate equation [5]:
a high minimum number yields more precise predictions of spot prices, but reduces the total number
of predictions and therefore reduces the number of observations in the main speciﬁcation, equation [3].
The primary results concerning forward price premia and trading quantities in local natural gas markets
do not qualitatively change as we adjust the minimum number, even when we increase it to 48 months.
28 Clustering instead on location, or not clustering at all, yields much smaller standard errors, under which
the results are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
24standard errors on year-month addresses correlation of the disturbances across locations,
it does not address inter-temporal correlation within a location. We therefore re-run spec-
iﬁcations 1 through 3 using Prais-Winsten GLS, and report these results in columns 4
through 6. The estimated autocorrelation parameters are small, and the GLS coeﬃcients
and standard errors diﬀer little from the IV estimates in columns 1 through 3.
These results provide evidence of forward price premia in local natural gas markets at
times and locations for which these markets are expected to be tight. This ﬁnding suggests
that natural gas markets are not frictionless, liquid, riskless markets. At a minimum, when
markets are expected to be tight, arbitrage between forward and spot markets fails to bring
forward prices down to expected spot prices. In section 3, we modeled several factors that
could lead to this forward premium, including security of supply, excess caution, and
price risk aversion. While a forward price premium is consistent with all three of these
explanations, only excess caution is likely to lead to a reduced volume of transactions
when markets are expected to be tight. To resolve these models, we next analyze data on
forward transaction volumes.
5. Evidence of reduced forward quantities
While “excess caution,” brought about by an asymmetric regulatory penalty for stocking
out of gas following a forward sale rather than a forward purchase, can explain the observed
forward price premia, other theories of behavior in these markets are also consistent with
this evidence. As discussed in section 3, appropriately shaped demand curves for gas,
reﬂective of security of supply concerns, may also cause forward premia when markets are
expected to be tight, as can price risk aversion on the part of of LDCs. However, only a
model of the excess caution of LDCs in selling gas predicts that forward trading quantities
will decrease in spot markets that are expected to be tight. This reduction occurs because
the number of potential sellers decreases as fewer ﬁrms are ex ante certain that they have
adequate gas to meet their maximum possible demand. On the other hand, both a model
of security of supply without excess caution and a model of price risk aversion suggest that
trading volumes are likely to rise when spot markets are expected to be tight; neither of
these alternative models can convincingly explain a signiﬁcant decline in forward trading
volume in such markets. We may therefore distinguish amongst these theories, or at least
assess which is dominant, by examining data on forward quantities in markets that are
expected to be tight or expected to be loose.
In addition to price data, Platts also reports the volume of gas traded during bidweek
at each market location from June 1999 to July 2007, with a gap in coverage from July
252002 to June 2004.29 We examine whether bidweek volumes are relatively low at locations
and months in which the market is expected to be tight, following an empirical strategy
paralleling that used to examine forward price premia. Speciﬁcally, we wish to estimate
the following equation, which uses expected spot price as the measure of market tightness
and controls for location ﬁxed eﬀects and a ﬂexible time trend.
ln(Vo lu m e it)=γ0 + γ1 E[Spotit]+µi + g(t)+ηit. [6]
We encounter the same problem in estimating equation [6] as we faced in estimating
equation [1]: we do not observe the expected spot price. We solve this problem using the
same solution that we used to estimate forward price premia in tight markets. Because the
realized spot price is equal to the expected spot price plus white noise, per equation [2], we
may re-write equation [6] as equation [7]below. We estimate equation [7] by instrumenting
for the realized spot price using the same ex ante price forecast–based on equations [4]
and [5]–that was used as an instrument in equation [3].
ln(Vo l u m e it)=γ0 + γ1 Spotit + µi + g(t)+( ηit − γ1ξit). [7]
Equation [7] takes as the dependent variable the natural logarithm of the total volume
of gas (measured in millions of cubic feet per month) traded in market i during bidweek of
month t−1 for delivery in month t (note that in designating this variable as Vo lu m e it,t h e
t refers to the delivery month). We use the logarithm of volume to avoid scaling problems
associated with the fact that some locations generally see much larger volumes than others:
average volumes at each location range from 4 million cubic feet per month to nearly 1,400
million cubic feet per month.
Matching the bidweek volume data to the spot price forecasts yields a sample with 5,062
observations, spread over 108 locations. Full summary statistics for bidweek volume are
reported in the ﬁnal row of table 1.
Column 1 of table 4 reports the results of estimating equation [7] with the bidweek
volume data. The estimated coeﬃcients demonstrate that forward volumes decline signiﬁ-
cantly in tight markets. A $1.00 increase in the expected spot price is predicted to decrease
the logarithm of forward trading volume by 0.079, equivalent to a decrease in volume of
29 This gap occurs due to a changeover in publications by Platts, prompted by its merger with FT Energy
in 2001. While prices are reported for these dates, volumes are not. In addition, there are a further 183
observations outside of these dates during which prices are reported, but not volumes.
267.6%. The eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level and is robust to adding month
ﬁxed eﬀects (column 2) and interactions between location ﬁxed eﬀects and a linear time
trend (column 3). These latter results indicate that the reduction in forward volume in
response to high expected prices is not merely a seasonal phenomenon, nor is it driven by
long-term secular trends.
As with estimating the forward price premium equation [3], one might be concerned
that the residuals from estimating equation [7] are autocorrelated. In columns 4 through
6, we estimate equation [7] using Prais-Winsten GLS. There is much more evidence of
autocorrelation here than in the price regression; the estimated autocorrelation coeﬃcients
(ˆ ρ) range from 0.34 to 0.54, depending on the speciﬁcation. The estimates of the coeﬃcient
of interest–the eﬀect of the expected spot price on bidweek volumes–are slightly higher
when estimated using GLS than with regular IV. The result presented in column 4, for
example, indicates that a $1.00 increase in the expected spot price leads to a decrease in
forward volume of 9.4% on average–a larger magnitude than that reported in column 1.
The estimated decreases in volume are still statistically signiﬁcant under GLS: the p-values
of the results reported in columns 4 through 6 are 0.032, 0.012, and 0.00008, respectively.
The implication of these results are that trade in forward markets is reduced when
spot prices are expected to be high. If, as we have argued, high spot prices coincide
with tight spot markets, then this suggests that there is a market ineﬃciency at work:
forward markets shrink at the very time they are most needed, namely when they could
compensate for tight spot markets. These reductions in forward quantities traded in tight
markets are consistent with a model in which the regulator penalizes curtailments caused by
forward sales more than curtailments caused by insuﬃcient forward purchases. Absent the
“excessively cautious” behavior caused by this regulatory asymmetry, a model of security
of supply concerns would predict the opposite of this result, as would a model of price-risk
aversion.30
6. Supplementary evidence from markets for gas transportation
The evidence we have presented so far has concerned the eﬀect of tight – markets
30 We also investigated regional variation in the price and quantity eﬀects that we have estimated. The
Northeast area (New York, New Jersey, and New England) is the area that one might expect to see
the strongest eﬀects, due to the combination of large weather variation and limited pipeline delivery
capacity. These conditions are reﬂected by the fact that the Northeast has both the largest average
price diﬀerential to Henry Hub of any region as well as the largest variance in this diﬀerential. We
found that the estimated coeﬃcients on the forward price premium (table 3) were twice as large for the
Northeast as for all locations, and statistically distinct from the average eﬀect at the 5% level. The
estimated impact on bidweek volume, however, (table 4) was about the same for the Northeast as for
all locations.
27for natural gas on the prices and volumes of transactions in local forward markets. As
we noted in section 2, an LDC can obtain the gas it needs to serve local market demand
either by buying gas in its local market, or by buying gas in an upstream, producing market
and then arranging for transportation from the producing region to the local market. We
now investigate the eﬀect that tight spot markets for natural gas have on markets for
pipeline transportation. We expect that the anticipation of tight spot markets would
lead to lower volumes in transportation markets, just as we found they did in natural gas
markets. Because data coverage is not as extensive for the transportation market as it is for
the natural gas markets we examined above, we categorize this section as supplementary
evidence.
6.1 Markets for pipeline capacity
Pipelines sell rights for most of their capacity to shippers under long-term contracts that
can be as long as 30 years in length. There is a maximum price set by FERC, known as the
“reservation charge,” that shippers can be charged for this property right.31 A shipper who
holds long-term transportation rights can sell part or all of its rights to another shipper
for a ﬁxed period of time, usually one calendar month, in a secondary market called the
capacity release market. The price for this transfer is negotiated between the “releasing”
and “awarded” shippers. Except for a brief “waiver period” from April 2001 through
September 2002, the capacity release transfer price was capped at the maximum reservation
charge set by FERC.32 Because the price cap on the capacity release market eﬀectively
constrains trade in tight markets–presenting a signiﬁcant confound in our analysis–we
only examine releases that occur during those months in which the cap was waived.
The Platts dataset that provided us with natural gas prices and volumes at locations
throughout the U.S. also contains information on transactions in the capacity release mar-
ket. In these data, each observation represents a transaction in which capacity rights are
sold for a ﬁxed time period on a speciﬁc pipeline route. Unlike the spot and bidweek gas
market data, the capacity release data are not based on surveys; they are a comprehensive
set of all releases that have occurred on each pipeline since Platts began tracking them.33
Each observation provides information regarding the transaction date, the duration of the
31 The charge is set at a level that will recover pipeline capital costs plus a reasonable rate of return on
investment.
32 The FERC issued the temporary waiver for the price cap, in Order 637, because it was concerned that
the cap constrained trade in tight markets. However, it let the waiver expire without comment at the
end of September 2002.
33 The year in which observations begin varies by pipeline, but is generally in the late 1990s.
28release, and the route along which capacity is released (many pipelines have multiple routes
either because they have a branched structure or because there exist receipt and delivery
points at intermediate locations along the line).
In the capacity release market, the expected spot value of the capacity is the expected
spot price diﬀerential between the two endpoints of the capacity release route. We call this
diﬀerential the spot margin. We expect high spot margins to coincide with high spot prices
for gas in downstream markets, because downstream spot markets will be tight only when
the capacity to transport gas into those downstream markets is fully utilized. It is during
these capacity constrained periods that the diﬀerential between upstream and downstream
gas prices may be large.
To facilitate the linking of capacity release transactions to their corresponding expected
spot margins, we deﬁne a capacity release product as a pipeline-route-month combination
for which capacity may be released. For example, capacity on Transcontinental Pipeline’s
route from Louisiana to New York for October 2003 constitutes a product. For each product
for which the necessary data are available, we compute a spot margin by subtracting the
spot price at the upstream node of the route during the relevant month from the spot price
at the downstream node. We also subtract the small variable cost of pipeline transportation
that must be paid to the pipeline by any user of capacity rights. This margin represents the
proﬁt that a shipping ﬁrm would make, absent the capacity release payment, by shipping
gas on the released route over the contract term, and is therefore an ex post measure of
the value of a capacity release for that product. Each product is associated with exactly
one spot margin; however, for any given product we may observe zero, one, or multiple
capacity releases.34
There are two types of capacity releases: recallable and non-recallable. In a recallable
release, the releasing ﬁrm has the right to recall its capacity from the awarded ﬁrm after
a contractually agreed notice period that can be as brief as 24 hours. The distinction
between recallable and non-recallable releases is important to our analysis. We aim to
investigate the reluctance of LDCs to sell forward capacity in tight markets at times when
they may later need the capacity to ship gas to serve demand. Recallable releases should
be less aﬀected by excess caution than non-recallable releases: recall rights allow an LDC
to recover its capacity in the event that it is needed (though a lag may be involved).
34 Some capacity release observations are dropped from the dataset for institutional reasons. We drop
releases that occur between companies that are aﬃliates, a small number of releases that are for terms
other than one calendar month, and releases for which the transaction occurs more than one month
ahead of the eﬀective month of the release.
29We therefore divide our analysis of capacity releases into recallable and non-recallable
releases. We anticipate that non-recallable releases will be signiﬁcantly less frequent in
tight markets, while the frequency of recallable releases will be relatively unaﬀected by
market tightness.
Our data include capacity releases on 11 routes on ﬁve major interstate pipelines:
Columbia Gulf, Florida Gas Transmission, Texas Eastern, Texas Gas Transmission, and
Transcontinental.35 The geographic distribution of these pipelines is indicated in the map
in ﬁgure 12. While all ﬁve pipelines receive gas in the Texas and Lousiana production basin,
their delivery points vary, and include New York, Appalachia, and Florida. As shown in
table 5, the ﬁnal capacity release dataset contains 155 products, 238 non-recallable capac-
ity releases, and 456 recallable releases. These are not spread uniformly across the ﬁve
pipelines or over the 18 months of observation. Eighty-seven products have no observed
non-recallable releases, whereas there are 3 products for which we observe more than ten.
Similarly, there exist 50 products that have no recallable releases, yet 4 products have
more than ten.
The distribution of spot margins is signiﬁcantly right-skewed, consistent with a gas
pipeline infrastructure that has spare capacity at most times, but occasionally does become
constrained.36 It is during these constrained periods that possession of ﬁrm transportation
rights can be extremely valuable.
6.2 Capacity release markets estimation and results
In this section, we examine the frequency with which we observe capacity releases and
assess whether transactions are less frequent when the market is expected to be tight (that
is, when spot margins are expected to be high). We measure the frequency of capacity
release transactions as the number of transactions during month t − 1 for capacity on
pipeline route i during month t.
CR Transactionsit = θ0 + θ1 E[SpotMarginit]+µi + g(t)+ζit. [8]
In estimating this speciﬁcation, we have the same problem that was encountered in
estimating equations [1] and [6]: we do not observe the expected spot margin. Similar to
35 While capacity release data were available for several other major pipelines, no more than thirty trans-
actions were observed for those lines, and they were therefore dropped.
36 The median spot margin is $0.07, the mean is $0.13, and the maximum is $1.61.
30the approach used previously, we note that the realized spot margin should be equal to
the expected spot margin plus an orthogonal error:
SpotMarginit = E[SpotMarginit]+υit. [9]
When we substitute equation [9] into equation [8] we obtain:
CR Transactionsit = θ0 + θ1 SpotMarginit + µi + g(t)+( ζit − θ1υit). [10]
In previous speciﬁcations, we used an instrumental variable to accommodate the mea-
surement error in our explanatory variable. However, the instruments that we used pre-
viously are not suitable here: the NYMEX futures price for Henry Hub will be correlated
with the levels of prices throughout the country, but will not be correlated with the dif-
ferential between prices at diﬀerent locations. In light of this, we proceed by estimating
equation [10] directly, noting that attenuation bias will work against the results we ﬁnd.
Given the integer nature of the number of releases per product, as well as the presence
of many products without any releases, we estimate equation [10] using a Poisson count
model. We report estimation results as incidence rate ratios (IRR’s). Each IRR should be
interpreted as the proportional change in the rate of occurrence of capacity releases as the
result of a $1.00 increase in the expected spot margin. The “null” eﬀect is an IRR of one,
and the p-values we report are for a test with this null hypothesis (standard errors are
clustered on year-month). An IRR of more than one indicates that an increase in expected
spot margin tends to increase the number of capacity releases, and an IRR of less than
one indicates the opposite. The attenuation bias noted above will bias the estimated IRR
towards one.
Results for non-recallable releases are reported in table 6. The interpretation of the
estimated IRR of 0.1149 indicated in column 1 is that a $0.10 increase in expected spot
margin will decrease the number of capacity release transactions by 19.5% on average.
The p-value of this eﬀect against the null is 0.053. When a time trend is added to the
speciﬁcation, as shown in column 2, the estimated coeﬃcient is similar, and the statistical
signiﬁcance slightly decreases. When month ﬁxed eﬀects are added to the speciﬁcation,
as shown in column 3, the estimated eﬀect decreases in magnitude (an increase in the
expected spot margin of $0.10 would decrease the number of transactions by 13.1%) and
the p-value increases to 0.155. Overall, these results buttress the evidence obtained from
local natural gas markets that forward trades are reduced when spot markets are expected
31to be tight.
Table 7 reports the results of estimating the Poisson model with recallable capacity
releases. As expected, the estimated eﬀect of tight markets on the number of recallable
releases is substantially weaker than that reported for non-recallable releases. Across
all three speciﬁcations, the estimated IRR’s are much closer to one and not statistically
signiﬁcant. Due to the imprecision of the estimates, however, pooling of the estimates for
recallable and non-recallable capacity releases cannot be rejected.
The analysis of capacity release transactions supports the existence of an asymmetric
regulatory penalty for selling reserves in the forward market and then curtailing customers.
There is an economically and statistically signiﬁcant decline in the number of non-recallable
capacity releases when the market is expected to be tight. Furthermore, there is much less
evidence of such an eﬀect for recallable capacity releases, for which the regulatory penalty
is less salient.
7. Conclusion and Broader Relevance
The natural gas industry involves ﬁrms that face security of supply concerns regarding
the procurement of essential inputs. When spot markets for these inputs are thin–as is
often the case in natural gas–then ﬁrms may be willing to pay a price premium to pur-
chase inputs on forward rather than spot markets, so as to guard against supply shortages.
Furthermore, the regulatory environment punishes particularly harshly those delivery cur-
tailments that can be linked to a utility having made forward sales of gas. We show
theoretically and empirically that the excess caution these regulatory incentives impose
on utilities can distort forward natural gas markets when demand is expected to be high.
At such times, this caution will cause forward prices to exceed expected spot prices, and
cause volume in the forward market to decline. In particular, there will be a reduction
in eﬃcient trade at precisely those times at which trade is most needed: when demand is
expected to be high and social surplus gain is greatest from transferring gas to those who
value it most.
As principal-agent incentive problems and security of supply concerns are hardly unique
to the natural gas industry, we suspect that these considerations may exist in other in-
dustries as well. For instance, consider the hypothetical example of a manager of an auto
plant, who has on hand more tires than he thinks he is likely to need given the range of
output levels the plant might be called on to produce in the next month. Should he try
to rid the plant of some of the excess supply of tires if he can do so at a proﬁt? If he
makes a proﬁt on the sale of the tires, it is likely to lead to a small reward. If, however,
32the plant is called upon to produce an unusually large number of cars, and the production
line has to be shut down because there aren’t enough tires, then the manager is likely
to suﬀer substantial negative consequences. In this case, organizational incentives rather
than regulatory incentives are the root cause of the manager’s caution. However, in both
this case and the case of natural gas, a forward sale of necessary inputs by the agent can
be used by the principal to infer that agent is lacking in either eﬀort or ability, and then to
punish the agent severely, perhaps even by ﬁring him and replacing him with a new agent.
The principal-agent model presented in appendix 2 indicates that these penalties for
observable actions that can be linked to negative outcomes may be eﬃcient from the prin-
cipal’s point of view, suggesting that rational managers in an organization may be willing
to apply them. However, this paper demonstrates that the impacts of these incentives
extend beyond the principal-agent relationship in which they are applied, and can cause
signiﬁcant market ineﬃciencies. In markets for necessary inputs, the excess caution cre-
ated by these principal-agent relationships can cause ﬁrms to be reluctant to engage in
trades, even when diﬀerences in marginal valuations are signiﬁcant.
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35Appendix 1: Forward Market Volume and Price Premium Under Security of Supply Concerns
Consider a model in which several wholesale gas buyers–LDCs who need to meet end-
use customer demand–are present at the downstream end of a pipeline. The LDCs holds
“reserves” in either local storage or through ﬁrm contracts for pipeline delivery at the time
purchasing for a given period begins. Customer demand varies exogenously due to weather
and other shocks and is extremely inelastic in the short run.
When the period of delivery arrives, the exogenously-determined customer demand and
the storability of excess supply combine to yield a convex LDC marginal value function.
The marginal value of supplies is very high for units up to the customer demand that
the LDC faces and ﬂattens out rapidly for units beyond that level, because additional
quantities can be put into storage. At the delivery period the LDC faces very asymmetric
costs of failing to match its procured supply with customer demand–much greater costs
if it has too little supply than if it has too much. If, however, it could always be sure that
it could adjust its total procurement quantity to exactly match its customers’ demand
through use of the spot market, this asymmetry would be of no consequence.
Consider the situation that the LDC faces when it attempts to buy its requirements
before retail demand shocks are known, i.e., the extreme case in which no adjustments are
feasible after demand shocks are revealed, because there are no spot market transactions.
Assume that an LDC knows its inverse marginal value function, D(q,w), and assume
that the probability distribution of the weather and other demand shocks that could occur,
f(w), is common knowledge. Prior to w being revealed, the LDC knows that it could have
one of many diﬀerent demand functions based on diﬀerent draws of w. For the reasons just
discussed, assume Dq(q,w) < 0, Dqq(q,w) > 0, and Dw(q,w) > 0, where the subscripts
denote derivatives.
Assume that the LDC is risk neutral with respect to price. Thus, recognizing that it
can make no adjustments in a spot market, the LDC would purchase or sell gas in the
forward market according to the demand function ¯ D(q) that would be the weighted average
demand function based on the probability distribution of f(w), ¯ D(q)=

w D(q,w)f(w)dw.
That is, ¯ D(q) is the probability-weighted average of the marginal valuation of additional
gas at a given q over all possible demand states. Since ¯ D(q)i saw e i g h t e da v e r a g eo fc o n v e x
functions, with non-negative weights, it follows that ¯ D(q)i sc o n v e x .
Result 1: Deﬁne ˆ q as the LDC’s expected spot market demand at spot price p, and assume
its inverse demand curve satisﬁes the suﬃcient condition: ∀(q,w)s u c ht h a tD(qi,w i)=
D(qj,w j)a n dwi <w j,w eh a v eDq(qi,w i) ≥ Dq(qj,w j). Then ¯ D(ˆ q) >p . That is, the
36ﬁrm’s marginal forward valuation at the quantity ˆ q that is its expected demand at spot
price p is greater than p. Equivalently, for any forward market price p,a nL D Cw i l lc h o o s e
to purchase a larger quantity in the forward market than it would in expectation if it faced
that same p i nt h es p o tm a r k e t( i.e., after w is revealed).
The result follows immediately from the convexity of D(q,w)i nq and the condition that
a positive weather shock causes demand to become (weakly) steeper at every given price.
Essentially, the value of holding extra supplies of gas before w is revealed is large because
the cost of a shortage (moving leftward up a steep demand curve) is much greater than the
cost of having excess supplies (moving rightward down a ﬂatter demand curve) at delivery
time.
The suﬃcient condition in result 1 is plausible, but not general. Parallel shifts of the
(convex) demand curve would result in such a forward demand premium. Proportional
quantity increases at all prices, however, need not; at a given price, a participant’s demand
in the forward market could be greater or less than its expected spot demand at that price.
If result 1 does hold, then it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium forward price
could be greater than the expected spot price.37
In reality, of course, a spot market does exist and some transactions occur after w is
revealed. There is some risk, however, that a ﬁrm will not be able to access the spot
market for some trades due to lack of market liquidity. Assume that the probability a ﬁrm
will be unable to access the spot market is φ.
If the ﬁrm could access the spot market with certainty (φ = 0), then, because it is risk
neutral with respect to price, it would be unwilling to buy in the forward market at any
price above the expected spot price, which we will call ¯ p, or sell at any price below the
expected spot price. Its forward market demand curve would be ﬂat at ¯ p. If, however, a
ﬁrm has some risk of failing to make a spot purchase, that failure has an expected cost in
lost value equal to the value of the incremental reserves, ¯ D(q). Thus, a ﬁrm expecting a spot
price of ¯ p will have a willingness to pay in the forward market of ˆ D(q)=( 1 −φ)·¯ p+φ· ¯ D(q).
37 A simple example in which a forward premium exists can be shown using ﬁgure 5. If there are two
ﬁrms that each in any period draw either the w1 or the w2 demand functions, their draws are perfectly
negatively correlated, and the total quantity available in the market is 2 · E[q], then the expected spot
price would be ¯ p and the futures price would be ¯ D(E[q]), which would be greater than ¯ p under the
conditions of result 1. An alternative example also illustrates one case is which we know there would
be no forward premium or discount: if the demands of the two ﬁrms were perfectly correlated, then the
expected spot price would just be the weighted average of D(E[q],w 1)a n dD(E[q],w 2), which would
exactly equal each ﬁrm’s ¯ D(E[q]). We believe, but have not proven, that this is a special case and
that if the demand shocks faced by the LDCs in the market are not perfectly rank correlated, then the
forward price will be greater than the expected spot price.
37The liquidity risk in the spot market means that the ﬁrm’s marginal willingness to buy
or sell in the forward market is a weighted average of its marginal forward valuation of
reserves (with no access to a spot market) and the expected spot price. Access to a spot
market with probability 1−φ reduces the magnitude of the forward valuation premium or
discount, but does not eliminate it. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 6.38
While ˆ D(q) would be an LDC’s demand for gas if it had no reserves going into the
forward market, each LDC actually starts with an endowment of gas reserves, qres,f o r
which it has already contracted. It would supply quantity to the market if p is above its
marginal forward marginal valuation at its current reserve level, denoted by ¯ D(qres), and
it would purchase from the market if p< ¯ D(qres). With ﬁrms possessing diﬀerent ˆ D(q)
and diﬀerent qres, each would have a diﬀerent ¯ D(qres) and diﬀerent supply and demand
curves, as illustrated in ﬁgure 4.
The supply and demand functions of all market participants aggregate into the market
supply and demand, which then determine the equilibrium forward price and quantity.
Besides the relationship between the forward and expected spot price, we are also interested
in the forward quantity and how that changes with market conditions. To examine this
relationship, we note ﬁrst that volume in the forward market is the sum of the diﬀerence
for each market participant between the reserves it holds going into the forward market
and the quantity it would choose to hold at the equilibrium price. That is, forward market
volume is equal to the mismatch between reserves and demand, 1
2

m |qres − ˆ D−1(pe)|,
where m indexes market participants and the 1
2 recognizes that each trade has one buyer
and one seller. Volume would be expected to vary with the anticipated “tightness” of the
gas market – which we measure as the expected spot price of gas – only to the extent
that tightness is correlated with size of mismatches in allocation of reserves.
It might seem at ﬁrst that no particular correlation would be expected, positive or neg-
ative, between market expected tightness and the size of reserve misallocations. However,
we sketch three reasons that there seems likely to be a positive correlation, suggesting that
this theory would imply forward volume would increase at times when the spot market is
38 The forward premium in a tight-market scenario at ﬁrst appears to create an opportunity for speculators
to engage in a risky arbitrage that is proﬁtable in expectation. However, the same liquidity risk that
creates the premium also undermines the opportunity for proﬁtable arbitrage. In order to take advantage
of the forward premium, a speculator would have to sell gas in the forward market, and then buy those
supplies from the spot market for delivery to the buyer from the forward market. Like other market
participants, however, the speculator would face the liquidity risk that it could not obtain the supplies
from the spot market that it had committed to deliver. In the event of a failure to deliver, the speculator
would be liable for the damage imposed on the buyer of the forward gas, which would presumably reﬂect
the buyer’s realized D(q,w). Thus, the speculator would be in no better position to take advantage of
this premium than other market participants.
38expected to be tight.
First is a simple scale eﬀect. High prices and tight gas markets are associated with
positive demand shocks much more than with negative supply shocks. Gas use is greater
in the winter when prices are on average higher. If reserve misallocation increases with
the total size of the reserve “pool,” this would tend to manifest as a positive correlation
between market tightness and forward volume.
Second is a heterogeneous impact eﬀect. One would expect there to be more reserve
misallocation at the time of the forward market if there is generally more uncertainty
about demand levels for the relevant period. Uncertainty about demand that exists prior
to the forward market, but is partially or completely resolved by the time of the forward
market, will increase the level of misallocation that can be corrected through trading in the
forward market. Not only are demand levels greater at times when prices tend to be higher,
demand variability is also greater at those times. This is both ex ante because demand
variability is greater in the winter and ex post because tight local markets generally reﬂect
some weather shock, which is likely to have unforecastably heterogeneous eﬀects on among
market participants. Thus, misallocation is likely to be greater than in tight markets than
in loose markets which are generally associated with less local demand uncertainty.
Third is an eﬀect from overcoming transaction costs. For a given quantity of misallocated
reserves, the gains from reallocation are likely to be greater if there is a tight market. In a
loose market, the supply and demand curves in the forward market are fairly ﬂat. Few or
no participants are desperate to purchase reserves and the gains from most potential trades
are small. Thus, if there is a per-unit transaction cost of trading reserves it will impede
more trades during loose markets and volume will be lower. In contrast, if the market is
expected to be tight, more participants are likely to have steep marginal valuation curves
around their current quantity levels. In that case, the gains from trade will be greater
and the transaction cost will impede fewer trades or, put diﬀerently, more of the potential
trades will clear the transaction cost hurdle necessary for a trade to be worthwhile.
None of these arguments settles the question, but each tilts clearly in the direction of
greater forward volume at times of tight gas markets. The magnitude of the eﬀects is less
clear. Still, it seems extremely unlikely that this model would explain decreases in forward
market volume associated with tight gas markets.
39Appendix 2: Principal-Agent Model of Procurement
Here, we oﬀer a model and numerical example to demonstrate that an optimizing principal
may beneﬁt from the imposition of incentives that cause procurement agents to exercise
“excess caution” in their sales of reserves. The primary features of the model correspond to
those discussed in the paper: the principal’s cost of being short of reserves is higher than
the cost of holding excess reserves, and the agents are heterogeneous in ability, so that some
are more skilled at forecasting demand than others. We show that the principal may want
to ﬁre an agent that held an insuﬃcient level of reserves relative to ex post needs, but only
if that agent had sold reserves prior to the shortage. The intuition driving the model is tied
to the concept of “plausible deniability,” in that the principal will not ﬁre an agent who
can plausibly claim that he held insuﬃcient reserves only because there was no additional
supply available for purchase in the market. While this asymmetric punishment does allow
the principal to cleanly distinguish high-ability agents from low-ability agents, it leads both
types of agents to be less likely to sell reserves.
Set-up
The timing of the model is as follows:
Period 0: The principal and the agent both observe the initial level of reserves, R0.
Period 1: The agent receives a signal, S, about the probability distribution of the ultimate
level of need, N, and decides on his target level of reserves, R∗.
Period 2: If R0 > R∗, the agent sells reserves until he is left with R∗. If R0 < R∗, the agent
attempts to buy reserves, which may or may not be successful. The ﬁnal level of reserves
is R2. After this, the principal observes R2 − R0, i.e., whether the agent bought or sold
reserves.
Period 3: The level of need, N, is realized. The principal observes whether R2 is greater
than or less than N, and rewards or punishes the agent accordingly.
The level of need, N, is distributed uniformly on one of two intervals, either [µ1−r,µ1+r]
or [µ2 − r,µ2 + r]. The probability that N is distributed on either interval is equal to 1/2.
All agents are aware of these ex-ante distributions.
Each agent may be either of the good type or the bad type. An agent is good with
40probability q and bad with probability 1 − q. The good agent receives a perfect signal
of which of the two possible distributions for N is correct; that is, he knows whether N
is distributed on [µ1 − r,µ1 + r] or [µ2 − r,µ2 + r]. The bad agent receives only a noisy
signal of which distribution is the true one—speciﬁcally, the signal indicates which of the
two distributions is correct with probability s ≥ 0.5. If s = 0.5, the signal is useless, and if
s = 1.0, a bad agent is equivalent to a good agent.
The agents know their types and are rational. In particular, the bad agent knows that
his signal may be incorrect, and takes this into account in his decisions.
In period 2, if the agent wishes to sell, he can do so. If he wishes to buy, he may or
may not be able to do so due to a thin marketplace. We model this by supposing that Y ,
a random variable, is the maximum amount that the agent will be able to buy if he decides
to buy. Y is distributed according to the cdf Pr(Y ≤ y) = 1 − e−τy, y ≥ 0 so that the
probability the agent will be able to buy at least y is given by e−τy. The probability that
the agent will be able to buy the quantity suﬃcient to reach his target level of reserves, R∗,
is therefore e−τ(R∗−R0).
The principal’s payoﬀ function is given by:
UP = −F(R2 − N) if R2 > N (1)
= −G(N − R2) if R2 < N (2)
where F(·) and G(·) are both positive and monotonically increasing, F(0) = G(0) = 0,
and G(x) > F(x)∀x. This means that the principal’s payoﬀ function is maximized (at 0)
when R2 = N, and that shortfalls and excesses have asymmetric costs: a shortfall in reserves
of any amount is more costly to the principal than excess reserves of the same amount.
While we model this problem as a single three period game, we recognize that a more
comprehensive approach would consider a repeated game. In such a framework, the agents’
valuations of future rounds would be modeled endogenously, and we would model the fact
that, when the principal and agent interact repeatedly, the principal may gradually learn
about the agent’s type even if the agent does not sell reserves and come up short. Here, we
abstract from the repeated game by compressing the model into one period, yet retain the
features that cause an agent who sells reserves and then fails to serve demand to be ﬁred.
41The mechanism
Let the principal’s transfers to the agent be deﬁned as follows, in which W is a ﬁxed wage (or
more precisely, a wage in excess of what the agent could earn through outside employment),
and α is a constant between zero and one:
AP = W − αF(R2 − N) if R2 > N (3)
= W − αG(N − R2) if R2 < N and R2 ≥ R0 (4)
= −αG(N − R2) if R2 < N and R2 < R0 (5)
Under this mechanism, the agent is ﬁred (and is no longer paid the ﬁxed wage) if he is
short of reserves after having sold reserves, but is not ﬁred if he is short following a purchase
of reserves or no change in reserve levels. In this sense, W can be thought of as the value of
all future wages, to be received by the agent only if he is not ﬁred.
The attractiveness of this feature to the principal will hinge upon whether useful infor-
mation is conveyed when an agent sells reserves and then experiences a stockout. If this
event implies that it is highly probable that the observed agent is of the bad type, then the
expected value of ﬁring the agent and drawing a new one from the pool will be positive. This
expected value must be suﬃciently large that it outweighs the expected cost to the principal
of distorting the agent’s behavior when selling reserves—the threat of being ﬁred will cause
the agent to exercise “excess caution” and target a higher reserve level when selling reserves
than when buying reserves. Further, we also allow for a ﬁxed cost of ﬁring, C.
The numerical example below shows that, with appropriate choices for parameter values,
the good agent will never sell reserves below the maximum possible demand, which is equal
to either µ1 + r or µ2 + r, depending on the known distribution of N. However, the bad
agent, who does not know which distribution is correct, will ﬁnd it value-maximizing to hold
fewer reserves than the maximum possible demand of µ2 + r. He thereby accepts a small
risk of being ﬁred so that he may avoid large penalties for holding excess reserves. The bad
agent will therefore, on occasion, sell reserves below the maximum possible demand, and
may experience a shortage after having sold. This diﬀerence in behavior allows the principal
to perfectly separate the two types. We show that, given this separation, ﬁring a bad agent
and replacing him with a new agent from the pool can increase the principal’s expected
payoﬀ. We also show that the principal will not want to ﬁre an agent that is observed with
an insuﬃcient level of reserves following a purchase, as such behavior does not send a clear
signal of type.
42Setup of numerical example
We will use a speciﬁc example with the following values:
µ1 = 9, µ2 = 10, and r = 2 (these together imply that N ∼ U[7,11] half the time and
N ∼ U[8,12] the other half)
q = 1
2 (the probabilities of drawing either a good or bad agent from the pool are equal)
s = 1
2 (the bad agent’s signal is useless)
R0 has a discrete distribution and is equal to 8 with probability 1




F(R2 − N) = 2(R2 − N) (linear cost of holding excess reserves)
G(N − R2) = 48(N − R2) (linear cost of being short)
α = 1
2 (half of the principal’s payoﬀ is passed through to the agent)
W = 4
The optimal choice of R∗
We begin by determining the optimal choice of R∗, from the principal’s point of view, under
the information sets of both the good agent and the bad agent. That is, we calculate what
the principal would direct the agent to procure, had he the ability to do so. Suppose ﬁrst








[−2(R2 − N) · IR2>N − 48(N − R2) · IR2<N]dN
Here, the IR2>N and IR2<N are indicator functions for R2 > N and R2 < N, and the 1/4 is
present because this is the value of the uniform pdf of N on its support interval [8, 12]. This














R∗ dN = 0
43The solution to this is R∗ = 11.84. That is, if the principal knew that N ∼ U[8,12] and
chose reserve levels himself, he would choose to hold a reserve level equal to 11.84. While
the set-up of this model does not permit the principal to choose reserves directly, note that
a variant of the mechanism above, without the ﬁxed wage that can be lost upon being ﬁred,
provides the agent with incentives that perfectly reﬂect the principal’s payoﬀs. That is, the
good type of agent, when confronted with such a mechanism, will also choose to hold a
reserve level equal to 11.84 when N ∼ U[8,12]. In a similar fashion, the good type of agent
will hold R∗ = 10.84 when N ∼ U[7,11].
Now consider the choice of R∗ that would maximize the principal’s payoﬀs if the infor-
mation available were that of the bad agent. In this case, the principal must choose R∗
to maximize his payoﬀ given that N may be distributed on either of two intervals. This
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Given an initial guess that R∗ > 11, this is equivalent to the following, in which
R 11
7 −48(N −
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Taking the FOC via Leibniz’s rule as before yields that R∗ = 11.68. That is, if the principal
had only the bad agent’s information set, he would like to direct the agent to hold a reserve
level equal to 11.68. If the principal were to oﬀer a bad agent a payoﬀ mechanism similar to
that above, but without the threat of being ﬁred, the bad agent would also choose this level
of reserves.
Solution to the example when the agents are sellers
We now turn our attention to the target levels of reserves the agents will choose given the
mechanism above (including the threat of being ﬁred). We ﬁrst focus on the case in which
R0 = 14. In this case, the initial level of reserves is higher than the maximum possible
level of need under either distribution of N. Therefore, both types of agents will be sellers
of reserves. We aim to show two results: ﬁrst, that the good agent will target a reserve
level equal to the maximum possible demand, given his signal, and, second, that the bad
agent will target a reserve level below the maximum possible demand given his noisy signal,
namely 12.
44The good agent, who knows the true distribution of N, will choose a level of reserves that
will balance the risk of being short (and therefore ﬁred) against the cost of holding excess
reserves. Suppose that the agent receives a signal that N ∼ U[8,12]. The maximization







[−(R2 − N) · IR2>N − [24(N − R2) + 4] · IR2<N]dN
Solving this using Leibniz’s rule yields that R∗ = 12—the maximum level of demand.
The cost of being ﬁred is suﬃciently high that the risk incurred by holding fewer reserves
than the maximum level perfectly balances the cost of holding excess inventory (for a ﬁxed
wage lower than W = 4, the good agent will hold fewer than 12 units of reserves). Similarly,
when the signal is N ∼ U[7,11], the agent will sell reserves until reaching R∗ = 11. These
results imply that the principal will never observe the good agent sell reserves and then fail
to meet realized demand.











4[−(R2 − N) · IR2>N − [24(N − R2) + 4] · IR2<N]dN
)
The solution is R∗ = 11.84. This implies that, if the N ∼ U[8,12] state of the world is
realized, then it is possible for the realized value of N to be high enough (namely, greater than
11.84) that the bad agent is short in Period 3, and therefore ﬁred. As an aside, note that this
result holds even when the bad agent’s signal is somewhat, though not fully informative—the
bad agent may be short for s ∈ (0.5,1).
Thus, the good agent will never expose himself to being ﬁred by selling reserves that he
might need, but the bad agent will. Therefore, whenever the principal observes that the
agent sells reserves but stocks out, he has a perfect signal that the agent is of the bad type.
Furthermore, the ﬁring incentive has caused both types of agents to sell fewer reserves than
what would be necessary to reach the optimal reserve level from the point of view of the
principal (equal to 11.84 or 10.84 in the case of a known high or low signal, and 11.65 in the
case of no signal).
Solution to the example when the agents are buyers
The second case to consider is that of R0 = 8, which implies that the agents must buy
reserves in order to meet demand. When the agents purchase reserves, the ﬁring penalty
45does not apply, so they will target reserve levels equal to those that are optimal for the
principal. That is, the good agents will target R∗ = 10.84 or R∗ = 11.84, depending on
their signal, and the bad agents will target R∗ = 11.68. However, there is a risk that the
agents will not be able to achieve their target: their probability of success in purchasing
any y = R2 − R0 is given by e−0.05y. Both types of agent may therefore be short of reserves
when R0 = 8. When the principal observes the agent purchase reserves, then come up short,
he must therefore use Bayes’ rule to determine the likelihood that the agent of the bad
type. The analysis below shows that this likelihood is not much greater than the underlying
probability of drawing a bad type from the pool, equal to q = 0.5.
We ﬁrst determine the probability that a good agent will purchase reserves, and still
be short. Taking the case of N ∼ U[8,12], the probability that the agent will successfully
procure R∗ = 11.84 is given by e−0.05(11.84−8) = 0.8253. The probability density function of
R2 is therefore given by:
f(R2) =
(
0.05exp(−0.05(R2 − 8)) if R2 ∈ [8,11.84)
0.8253 if R2 = 11.84
Given that N ∼ U[8,12], the probability that the agent will be short conditional on a given
R2 is the probability that the realized value of N will be less than R2, given by 3 − R2
4 .
The unconditional probability that the good agent will be short is then determined by the
following integral, which integrates the conditional probability over the pdf of R2:











This evaluates to a probability of 0.1265. When N ∼ U[7,11], the good agent targets
R∗ = 10.84, and the probability of a stockout is 0.0881. Thus, a good agent will be short of
reserves following a purchase with an average probability of 0.1073.
The bad agent always targets R∗ = 11.68 when buying reserves. The agent will be able
to procure reserves suﬃcient to reach this level with probability 0.8319, and the overall























The ﬁrst integral represents the probability of stockout if N ∼ U[8,12], and the second
represents the stockout probability if N ∼ U[7,11]. This evaluates to a probability of
0.1399.
46With these probabilities in hand, we are now in a position to use Bayes’ rule to ﬁnd
the probability that, having observed a stockout following a purchase, the agent is bad. We
have:
Pr(badagent|R2 < N) =




1/2 · (0.1073 + 0.1399)
= 0.5659
Observing a purchase followed by a stockout causes the principal to believe that the agent
is bad with a 56.59% probability—a small increase over his prior of 50%.
Payoﬀs from the mechanism, and the incentive to ﬁre
With the agents’ actions now determined under all possible scenarios, we can calculate the
expected payoﬀs to the principal. As an example of such a calculation, the expected payoﬀ
to the principal from having a good agent with a low signal who is a seller of reserves, when







−2(10.84 − N)dN − 48
Z 11
10.84
(N − 10.84)dN] = −3.84
The case of a good agent with a low signal who is a buyer of reserves requires a double













∗0.05exp(−0.05(R2 − 8))dR2 − 0.8676 ∗ 3.84
= −6.14
Proceeding with integrals such as these for all cases yields the following table of results for
the principal’s payoﬀs:
high signal low signal
good agent good agent bad agent good - bad
R∗ Payoﬀ R∗ Payoﬀ R∗ Payoﬀ
R0 = 14, no ﬁring 11.84 -3.84 10.84 -3.84 11.68 -4.68 0.84
R0 = 14, ﬁring 12.00 -4.00 11.00 -4.00 11.84 -4.76 0.76
R0 = 8 (buying) 11.84 -9.46 10.84 -6.14 11.68 -8.52 0.72
Fire - don’t ﬁre -0.08 -0.08 -0.02
The ﬁrst row of the table shows the target R∗ for each type of agent, as well as the expected
loss to the principal, when the agents are sellers of reserves and the mechanism of transfers
47from the principal to the agent does not include the threat of being ﬁred. The second row
also shows values for the case when the agents are sellers, but indicates behavior when the
agents may be ﬁred for selling and then stocking out. The third row illustrates the agents’
behavior and the principal’s losses when the agents are buyers of reserves (this behavior is
invariant with regards to whether the mechanism includes ﬁring or not, since the mechanism
calls for ﬁring the agent only if the agent has a stockout after having sold reserves).
The ﬁnal row provides the expected change in the one-shot payoﬀ to the principal when
ﬁring is included in the mechanism. Because the threat of being ﬁred distorts the agents’
incentives so that they are excessively cautionary when selling reserves, this mechanism
causes a small decrease in payoﬀ. However, the expected payoﬀ of ﬁring a bad agent and
replacing him with a new agent from the agent pool must also be considered. The last
column of the table indicates the expected diﬀerence in payoﬀ between the good agent and
the bad agent—the good agent yields substantially greater expected proﬁts to the principal:
when the ﬁring mechanism is in place, the additional expected payoﬀ of a good agent is
equal to 0.74 (this is the average of 0.72 and 0.76). Given the 50/50 chance of drawing a
good agent from the pool, ﬁring the bad agent yields an expected beneﬁt of 0.37, greater
than the small distortionary cost of the ﬁring mechanism.
Also note that, given a small ﬁxed cost of ﬁring, the principal will not choose to ﬁre the
agent if the agent is observed with a stockout following a purchase of reserves. Recall that
such an observation implies that the agent is bad with a probability of only 0.5659. Thus,
if the principal ﬁres the agent, there is only a 0.5 · 0.5659 = 0.2830 probability of actually
replacing a bad agent with a good agent, and a 0.5·0.4341 = 0.2170 probability of replacing
a good agent with a bad agent! The expected payoﬀ of carrying out the ﬁring is only 0.05.
Therefore, as long as the ﬁxed cost of ﬁring, C, is greater than 0.05 but less than 0.37, it
is beneﬁcial for the principal to ﬁre the agent when he observes a stockout following a sale,


















Demand for gas supplies 
in delivery month 
Demand for gas supplies in the delivery month (i.e., once the demand realization is known) 
is convex, reflecting asymmetric costs of insufficient vs. excess supplies of gas. Realized 
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The marginal valuation of any incremental unit of gas supply in the forward market will be the 
expectation of marginal valuations of that unit of gas under the possible demand realizations. 
This graph illustrates a hypothetical example with two equally likely demand realizations. 
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Each panel shows the supply and demand curves in the forward market for two different LDCs. In panel (a), both LDCs have a 
relatively high level of reserves, meaning that for these firms, qres would lie on the lower, righthand portion of  the marginal 
valuation curve depicted in Figure 3. In panel (b), both LDCs have a relatively low level of reserves, meaning that for these firms, 
qres would lie on the upper lefthand portion of the marginal valuation curve depicted in Figure 3. Note that in panel (a), the marginal 
valuation at the vertical axis (which represents the current level of reserves) is very similar for the two firms, while in panel (b), the 
marginal valuation at the current level of reserves is very different for the two firms. 
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Demand for reserves 
in forward market 
Supply of reserves  
in forward market 
D(qres) 
Before the delivery month begins, an LDC will have some quantity of reserves, qres. The 
marginal valuation of this quantity is D(qres). If the forward price is above this, the LDC will want 
to sell reserves according to the marginal valuation schedule, D(q), which lies above D(qres). 
Conversely, if the forward price is below D(qres), the LDC will want to buy reserves according to 
the lower part of the marginal valuation schedule. 
_ 
_  _ 




















q2  E(q)  q1 
If an LDC faced a price of p in the spot market under the high demand condition (w1), it would 
wish to have supplies of q1. If it faced the same price of p in the low demand condition (w2), it 
would wish to have supplies of q2. The expected level of supplies it would wish to have if it had 
access to a reliable spot market at a spot price of p is therefore E(q), the average of q1 and q2. In 
the forward market, the LDC’s willingness-to-pay for the quantity E(q) is D(E(q)), which is greater 
than p.  








Panel (a) shows the market demand and supply of natural gas (aggregated over all LDCs in the market) in the 
forward market when the spot market is expected to be loose. Panel (b) shows the forward market supply and 
demand in when the spot market is expected to be tight. 
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For an LDC that may have access to the spot market, its willingness-to-pay in the forward 
market is D(q), which is the weighted average of D(q)—the LDC’s marginal valuation for gas in 
the forward market when it cannot access the spot market—and p, the expected spot price. The 
weight used to average is the probability that the firm will have access to the spot market. Note 
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(a)  (b) 
In both panels, D(q) represents an LDC’s willingness to buy and sell in the forward market if there is no extra regulatory penalty 
associated with having to curtail customers after having sold reserves in the forward market and then being unable to procure them 
in the spot market. D(q) represents the willingness to buy and sell if an LDC does face such a regulatory penalty. Panel (a) shows 
an LDC with abundant reserves relative to the range of realized customer demands it thinks likely. The LDC in panel (a) could sell 
reserves in the forward market with a near zero increase in the probability of incurring the regulatory penalty. Panel (b) shows an 
LDC in a tight reserve position. For the LDC in panel (b) any sale of reserves in the forward market will result in a non-negligible 










A hypothetical forward market with a large number of risk neutral, and some risk averse, buyers and sellers. An increase 
in the variance of spot prices is represented by the shift from Df to D’f and from Sf to S’f. The effects of risk aversion are 
exacerbated: hedging buyers are willing to pay more and speculative buyers willing to pay less, while hedging sellers are 








Risk neutral buyers 
Hedging sellers 
Speculative sellers 
Risk neutral sellers 






A hypothetical forward market with no risk neutral traders. This graph shows a special case in 
which the forward price equals the expected spot price. In this case, increased price volatility in 














A hypothetical forward market with no risk neutral traders. This graph shows a case in which there 
is a forward price premium. Increased volatility in the spot price would increase the forward price 















locations Median Mean Std Dev Min Max
Spot Price ($/mmbtu) 11619 131 2.71 3.68 2.26 0.87 23.96
Bidweek Price ($/mmbtu) 11619 131 2.69 3.67 2.30 0.82 19.76
Henry Hub Future Price ($/mmbtu) 174 n/a 2.92 4.04 2.47 1.42 14.27
Basis Differential to Henry Hub ($/mmbtu) 11619 131 -0.08 -0.13 0.72 -2.16 26.11
Bidweek Volume (million cubic ft / month) 5062 108 245 465 562 1 4992















Mean Coef Over 
Valid RR Predictions
(174 regressions)
Std Deviation of 







N 17438 - -
R
2 0.8688 - -
Regressions include location fixed effects
†Standard errors are clustered on year-month


































0.2120 0.1982 0.2029 0.1871 0.1894 0.1940
(0.1259) (0.1070) (0.1090) (0.1116) (0.1026) (0.1047)




Month-of-year fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Linear time trend * location 
interaction
NNYNNY
ρ - - - -0.064 -0.024 -0.023
N 11619 11619 11619 11619 11619 11619
GLS regressions use Prais-Winsten
Standard errors are clustered on year-month
Spot price
(instrumented with prediction)
Table 3: Determinants of Bidweek Price Minus Spot Price






















-0.0789 -0.0761 -0.0622 -0.0986 -0.0771 -0.0693
(0.0135) (0.0128) (0.0116) (0.0451) (0.0299) (0.0175)




Month-of-year fixed effects N Y Y N Y Y
Linear time trend * location 
interaction
NNYNNY
ρ - - - 0.535 0.540 0.342
N 5062 5062 5062 5062 5062 5062
GLS regressions use Prais-Winsten
Standard errors are clustered on year-month
Spot price
(instrumented with prediction)
Table 4: Determinants of Bidweek Volume
 















































Number Pipeline # of Routes





# of Recallable 
Capacity Releases
1 Coumbia Gulf 2 28 72 64
2 Florida Gas 3 30 11 50
3 Texas Eastern 4 51 36 168
4 Texas Gas 1 18 16 129
5 Transcontinental 2 28 103 45
Total 12 155 238 456
Table 5: Number of Products and Capacity Releases by Pipe
 
 



























Standard errors are clustered on year-month
YYY







































Table 7: Determinants of Number of Recallable Capacity Releases Per Month
Poisson Regressions
123
YYY
 